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ABSTRACT
Sinatra, Kathleen.Human Rights Activism: The Catalyst of Transitional Justice? Department of
Political Science, March 2021.
Advisor: Çıdam, Çiğdem

This thesis demonstrates the essential role human rights activists play in the process of
transitional justice. Through an analysis of the conceptualizations of transitional justice, in which
I argue we must understand the process in broader terms that include both judicial and
non-judicial practices, I enter into a comparative analysis of the case studies of Argentina and
Spain. I explore Argentina’s Dirty War and the wound that was subsequently created. I question
how this wound came to be and how the country chose to deal with it. I then turn my attention to
the case of Spain, who unlike Argentina, did not undergo a formal process of transitional justice.
Here, I analyze the informal process of transitional justice that occurred and the work of human
rights activists in this process, looking to the possibility of a formal process similar to Argentina
perhaps occurring in the future. I conclude my thesis by raising the question: what can we learn
from the cases of Argentina and Spain and how can we apply this to the United State’s, who has
not undergone a process of transitional justice but seems to be looking to engage with one.
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Introduction
The Holocaust and Germany, Apartheid in South Africa, genocide in Rwanda: the list of
countries who have suffered widespread atrocity is extensive. When considering the active role a
government and its citizens have in perpetuating and executing abuse, the need to rebuild and
heal a fractured society becomes essential. Thomas McCarthy writes that “redressing past
wrongs is essential to establishing conditions of justice in a society scarred by the enduring and
pervasive effects of those wrongs,” arguing that when not addressed, these historical injustices
continue to impact modern society (McCarthy 2004). However, this thesis first grapples with the
question: how does a country approach the process of healing? The most significant answer to
this has been through transitional justice, a process which combines both judicial and
non-judicial mechanisms in order to address human rights abuses. The rise of transitional justice
has also led to a questioning of its application elsewhere, specifically to countries who have a
history of abuse that has gone unaddressed. How should these countries, who have either never
or not fully addressed their dark pasts but whose pasts still continue to haunt them in the present,
engage in a process of transitional justice? The United States is among those countries that have
been called upon to engage in a process of transitional justice. Discussion surrounding this
argues that modern inequalities related to health care, education, and income, among others, in
America have been caused by the failure to address the historical oppression of
African-Americans that can be dated back to abuse starting as early as colonial era slavery
(McCarthy 2004). While transitional justice is not always what is directly called for in the U.S.,
demands for reparations, the removal of Confederate era statues, and the formal condemnation of
systematic and widespread inequality all indirectly and directly call for a process of transitional
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justice. The following will provide analysis on the use of transitional justice in Argentina, a
country that underwent a formal process of transitional justice following the Dirty War, and then
compare it to Spain, a country that failed to address their dark past related to their Civil War and
Franco’s dictatorship.
Through an examination of these two cases, I will question: how should we conceptualize
transitional justice? What role do activists play in advancing transitional justice? Should the
work of human rights activists be considered to be part of an informal process of transitional
justice? My thesis will ultimately describe that a key catalyst in the process of transitional justice
is the work of human rights activists and organizations. These activists are able to push forward a
formal process of transitional justice, as seen through their leveraging of the international
community, the attempts to create a social movement, a public return to memory and
re-examination of the past. Additionally, this thesis will describe how the work of human rights
activists and organizations in it of itself engage in, what I call, an informal process of transitional
justice. Through their work, activists are able to achieve accountability, bring about a certain
type of justice, and engage in an important form of remembrance that forces the public to
acknowledge and re-examine the past and the present. By examining both cases, and the role of
human rights activists as actors who advocate for and advance formal processes of transitional
justice and engage in an informal process of transitional justice, I will look to understand how a
country can overcome widespread and systematic atrocity. Ultimately, after an examination of
Argentina and Spain’s approaches to dealing with their respective pasts, and their varying
transitional justice processes, I will look to understand how these cases can potentially provide
us with a framework for how countries can deal with and overcome atrocity, looking specifically
at the United States.
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The first chapter discusses how we should conceptualize transitional justice. I provide
two different conceptualizations, one that is narrower, drawing on Ruti Teitel, and one that is
broader, by the UN Secretary General's 2004 Report on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice
in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies. In this section, I detail the history of transitional justice
and how the rapid proliferation of material regarding this topic has led to the need to consider its
current conceptualization. I then look at Teitel’s conceptualization of transitional justice, which I
argue is too narrow as it focuses solely on specific legal mechanisms, leaving no room for an
equal emphasis on non-judicial mechanisms. I then turn to an analysis of why we should
understand transitional justice in more broad terms, looking at the benefits of truth commissions
and reparations as two main non-judicial mechanisms.
The second chapter delves into Argentina’s Dirty War in which the military dictatorship
brutally repressed and abused the country’s citizens for eight years. I begin my paper with a
historical account of the pre-dictatorship era. I then turn to an analysis of the dictatorship in
which I look at the CONADEP Nunca Más report in order to elaborate on the specific abuses
committed against Argentine citizens at the hands of the state. This section then highlights the
emergence of human rights activism during the dictatorship, highlighting that, despite the severe
repression, it was not so repressive so as to block all attempts for activism, extensively
referencing the work of the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo. I next question what caused the end of
the dictatorship, ultimately asserting that it was not just the Malvinas War, as some have
suggested, but rather a series of factors, including that of the pressure placed on the dictatorship
by the emergent human rights movement. I conclude my paper with an analysis of the
transitional justice process that the country underwent, drawing specifically on the framework
offered by Francesca Lessa, but highlighting the important work of human rights activists that
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began not in the “time of memory,” but emerged and continued to grow starting during the
dictatorship.
The third chapter then turns to the case of Spain, a country who unlike Argentina, did not
immediately confront their past which included a deadly Civil War followed by a near 40-year
long dictatorship that abused and repressed their citizens. I begin with a brief overview of the
Spanish Civil War and its effects. I then shift my focus to the utilization of the framework offered
by José González which breaks down Spain’s period following the Civil War into three sections,
the “time of silence,” the “time of forgetfulness,” and the “time of memory” (González 2007). I
analyze each of these three periods, highlighting the specific role of human rights activism,
which was largely unable to occur within the state during the dictatorship for various reasons,
which are discussed in the chapter. I then address how human rights activism did begin to occur
during the “time of forgetfulness” suggesting that, in a similar sense to that of Argentina,
activism did not suddenly occur during the “time of memory,” but rather had roots already set in
place prior to this that were finally realized once the conditions permitted. Throughout the piece,
I make comparisons between Spain and Argentina’s process helping to illustrate why Spain in
particular did not engage in a process of transitional justice immediately following the end of the
dictatorship. I conclude my chapter looking at the “time of memory” in which we now see the
country begin to address this past, perhaps suggesting that they will eventually pursue a formal
process of transitional justice similar to Argentina.
In my final chapter, I raise the question of how we can understand the transitional justice
processes of Argentina and Spain in relation to the United State’s. The United States also did not
address their slave past and it has thus been suggested that current inequalities stem from this
lack of action and addressment. In highlighting the key components of human rights activism in
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Spain and Argentina and applying this to the possible application in the U.S., I ultimately assert
that transitional justice should be understood to include both formal and informal processes.

Chapter 1: Narrower and Broader Conceptions of Transitional Justice
The phrase ‘transitional justice’ is thought to have first been used in 1991 as a way of
describing recent changes following the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of junta
regimes in Latin America (Hinton 2010, Teitel 2008). Transitional justice has been described as
“a legal and philosophical theory and a global practice that aims to redress wrongdoing, past and
present, in order to vindicate victims, hold perpetrators to account, and transform
relationships—among citizens as well as between citizens and public officials” (Murphy 2021).
The phrase transitional justice has a debated origin, some thinking there is likely more than one
originator. Ruti Teitel is among the thinkers who have been thought to have coined this term. As
an originator of the phrase, Teitel wrote that it aimed, “to account for the self-conscious
construction of a distinctive conception of justice associated with periods of radical political
change following past oppressive rule” (Teitel 2008, 1, Arthur 2009).
There has been a significant proliferation of literature regarding transitional justice. Over
the past few decades, the practice has greatly evolved with the introduction and normalization of
new mechanisms and the implementation of the practice (Murphy 2021). We see the successful
use of non-judicial mechanisms, such as that of the utilization of truth commissions in Argentina
in the 1980s, as well as expanded use of legal mechanisms, such as the use of universal
jurisdiction in the case of Chile against General Pinochet, and the establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal in the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), both in the 1990s. As the
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process has changed and expanded with modern historical applications, we are forced to consider
how we are to now conceptualize transitional justice.
This evolution has revealed current discrepancies in regard to how transitional justice is
understood. Some theorists conceptualize transitional justice in a narrow scope, focusing on the
process in terms of its legal mechanisms (Teitel 2002, Roht-Arriaza 2006), while others suggest
that it should be conceptualized more broadly to allow for the inclusion of both judicial and
non-judicial mechanisms. In the following, I will intervene into this debate and discuss both
approaches, ultimately asserting that we need to move away from a narrower conceptualization
that focuses on only legal processes to a broader one. With this conceptualization, I argue that
countries will be best able to address the wounds the atrocity created in society as they provide
more space for alternative mechanisms and approaches. Ultimately, this conceptualization allows
for the necessary recognition of both formal and informal processes in regard to transitional
justice, as will later be seen through the comparative analysis of both Argentina and Spain’s
experiences.
In order to make these points, I am going to first provide an overview on the history of
transitional justice both looking at the origin of the phrase and the practices associated with it. To
then address conceptual differences, I will first turn to Ruti Teitel’s conceptualization of
transitional justice to discuss what I argue is a narrower conception of the practice. Her
conceptualization, which focuses on legal mechanisms as the sole mechanism that can provide
“ideal justice,” leads me to thus argue that despite her efforts to broaden it, this conception
remains incomplete. I will then turn to the UN Secretary General's 2004 Report on the Rule of
Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies to discuss a broader
conception of transitional justice that includes both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. I will
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conclude by explaining why the narrower conception is incomplete as it fails to recognize the
potential successes, including that of accountability, remembrance, and truth, that can be realized
through non-judicial mechanisms. Furthermore, I will note that when non-judicial mechanisms
are blocked, the opportunity to turn to alternatives, including non-judicial mechanisms, should be
explored.

Part I. History of Transitional Justice
While the term itself may have an origin in recent history, some of the practices related to
modern conceptions of transitional justice are thought to have been around longer. The exact
origin of transitional justice as a practice has also been contested. Some have looked as far back
as Ancient Greece citing an instance in which the newly established democracy attempted to
address past tyranny through the implementation of various practices (Zunino 2019). However,
two recent historical moments are more frequently credited with beginning the history of
transitional justice. The dominant narrative tends to cite the Nuremberg Trials in Germany
following World War II as being the first example of transitional justice due to the successful use
and implementation of an International Military Tribunal that tried and held accountable Nazi
leaders (Zunino 2019, Hinton 2010). This case remains of particular significance due to its
related expansion of international human rights laws in which the Geneva and Hague
conventions were simultaneously crafted (Hinton 2010). Kathryn Sikkink writes, “The
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II were in many ways both the beginning of the
trend and the exception that proves the rule: only in cases of complete defeat in war was it
possible to hold state perpetrators criminally accountable for human rights violations” (Sikkink
2011, 13). The Nuremberg and subsequent Tokyo trials did not fully shape transitional justice

Sinatra 11
due to the limitations this case presented, asserting that it could only be applied after “complete
defeat in war” (Sikkink 2011). However, these trials certainly influenced, if not began, the
practice and formation of the ideological basis for transitional justice (Sikkink 2011). The rise of
transitional justice practices in the 1980s, primarily in South America, have also been noted as a
possible point of origin, traditionally beginning with that of the Argentine response following the
fall of their military dictatorship in 1983. The case of Argentina expanded normalized
conceptions of transitional justice practices having successfully established the use of a truth
commission in addition to the trial of military leaders, a practice in which “there were few
historical precedents...meaning the government was essentially inventing new tactics and
institutional forms” (Sikkink 2011, 120). Furthermore, Argentina’s return to a process of
transitional justice years after their truth commission and initial trials highlights, on a more
global scale, an important aspect of the process of transitional justice- that is, that it is not
necessarily a finite process.
The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has also been noted as
building off of the foundation provided by the Nuremberg Trials in which “The ICC can be
understood to symbolize the entrenchment of the exceptional Nuremberg Nazi War Crime
Tribunals as a model for the creation of a standing international war crimes tribunal to prosecute
war crimes under the international law of conflict” (Teitel 2002, 903). The Nuremberg Trials
have been suggested to have been the most successful example of war crime tribunals, and thus
have served as a key catalyst in shaping modern conceptions of transitional justice (Hinton 2010,
Bass 2000). Transitional justice encompasses institutions, mechanisms, and legal practices and
the literature on this process has rapidly emerged in the last few decades forcing us to question
how we should conceptualize it today.
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II. A Narrower Conception
Narrower conceptions of transitional justice tend to focus largely on the legal and judicial
processes. Ruti G. Teitel defines transitional justice as, “the view of justice associated with
periods of political change, as reflected in the phenomenology of primarily legal responses that
deal with the wrongdoing of repressive predecessor regimes” (Teitel 2002, 893). Teitel argues
that modern applications and conceptions of transitional justice have greatly affected the process
and ultimately narrowed it by expanding practices and conceptions, writing, “Whereas, in theory,
transitional justice appeared to assume its potentially limitless universal extension into the law, in
its late twentieth-century applications, the responses are concededly more contextual, limited,
and provisional” (Teitel 2002, 896). Here, Teitel asserts that the increased involvement of the
international community, and rise of subsequent bodies as a result of globalization, have limited
the power of the state by prioritizing international justice mechanisms over national conceptions
of justice (Teitel 2002, 898). According to Teitel, the shift to international justice mechanisms
had an undesirable effect in terms of the goals espoused by transitional justice. She writes,
“Whereas, at first, the aims of transitional justice were the ambitious goals of establishing the
rule of law and democracy, in the last decade, its aims are concededly more modest, primarily
focusing on maintaining peace and stability” (Teitel 2002, 898). Here, Teitel suggests that when
transitional justice is conceptualized as attempting to achieve peace and stability, the aims of rule
of law and democracy may be compromised or lost entirely. Thus, in Teitel’s opinion, this
becomes problematic in terms of achieving justice since only having peace or stability, and
letting the crimes go unaccounted for, is ultimately not justice.
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Judicial Mechanisms
It is here that we begin to understand exactly what mechanisms Teitel is favoring. While
trials exist so as to legally convict abusers of their crimes, these trials can be hosted either by the
country in which the crime occurred, a foreign country, or through an international body. Trials
may be conducted by the state if the crime was committed within the state, and these trials may
be done with support or guidance from an international body (Lessa 2013). Foreign trials rely on
universal jurisdiction, which the UN report referred to as, “a previously little used element of
international law that holds that some crimes are so grave that all countries have an interest in
prosecuting them” (United Nations Secretary General 2004). This essentially allows foreign
countries to criminally prosecute individuals regardless of their nationality or country of
residence for “serious crimes against international law — such as crimes against humanity, war
crimes, genocide, and torture — based on the principle that such crimes harm the international
community or international order itself, which individual States may act to protect” (“Universal
Jurisdiction.”). Finally, international bodies, such as the U.N. and the International Criminal
Court (ICC), may be utilized to try countries or large groups for crimes committed at the global
level (Lessa 2013).
Teitel’s perspective is that, rather than giving preference to all legal mechanisms that
have been associated with the evolution of modern transitional justice practices, favoring specific
legal responses is most effective. She writes, “The move towards local and even privatized
justice associated with the State-building discussed above is in tension with the potential for a
broader conception of justice associated with transnational politics” (Teitel 2002, 899). Teitel
pinpoints the end of the Cold War as when this modernization of transitional justice occurs.
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Thus, Teitel criticizes what have been typically considered historic feats in transitional justice,
such as the use of universal jurisdiction and the creation of international tribunals, stating that,
while the latter is able to provide a certain level of “regime accountability,” the expansion of
transitional justice mechanisms that a country can draw upon presents multiple dilemmas to the
aims of the practice as well as to the policymaking community (Teitel 2002). These dilemmas,
which are a result of “expanding the continuum of choices in transitional justice,” become a
“basis for intervention, and the problematizing of war and aggression, caus[ing] new and ever
changing transitional justice dilemmas to come to the surface, and throw[ing] into balance the
aims of justice and peace” (Teitel 2002, 903).
While Teitel is right in arguing for the use of judicial measures, she fails to acknowledge
the relevance of non-judicial mechanisms that can be both significant alone or, most ideally,
working in tandem with judicial mechanisms. Despite the potential accountability that these
non-judicial mechanisms provide, Teitel maintains a stance that discourages the expansion of
transitional justice mechanisms to include non-judicial practices, the involvement of foreign and
international bodies and governments in judicial processes, as well as legal actions that are
contextual and localized.

Teitel’s Argument
Teitel ultimately argues that the expansion of transitional justice in contemporary politics
has led to the harmful normalization of emergent discourse and action regarding the practice.
Citing the expansion of humanitarian law coupled with the rise of international involvement in
processes related to transitional justice, such as the establishment of international tribunals, Teitel
writes that, “this development is problematic, because the jurisprudence associated with political
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flux is, by its character, associated with a higher degree of politicization and irregularity than
would ordinarily be acceptable in liberal democracies” (Teitel 2002, 902). It is both the lack of
normative measures as a result of this expansion as well as the emphasis placed on international
justice over that of national justice that Teitel argues allows for the continuous arisal of new
dilemmas facing the practice. Thus, Teitel asserts that this change in transitional justice is
potentially harmful and how, as a practice, it now offers a more limited response. She does,
however, recognize that resisting this normalization is difficult in our globalized political sphere.
Teitel goes on to assert that one might view this shift in conceptualization as a
“preservative form of justice, which concededly sacrifices the aims of ideal justice for the more
limited ones of assuring peace and stability” (Teitel 2002, 898). This is where I argue that Teitel’s
argument falls short, as the notion that there is an “ideal justice,” which relies on specific judicial
measures, fails to recognize the multidimensionality of justice. While she notes the potential
interconnected nature of the goals, she ultimately asserts that peacemaking alone has not been
shown to achieve the goals of democracy and the rule of law, and thus does not achieve the ideal
form of justice (Teitel 2002). Additionally, while Teitel criticizes alternative approaches to
judicial mechanisms, she fails to acknowledge the reality that not all legal responses, even the
ones she deems best suited, are productive. On this, Rosemary Nagy writes that “There is a
privilege of legal responses which are at times detrimentally abstracted from lived realities”
(Nagy 2008). This becomes even more problematic when considering that the implementation of
these legal practices often rely on the support of the state. Thus, when the state blocks formal
transitional justice mechanisms, such as legal proceedings, how else are perpetrators meant to be
held accountable for their crimes and the country to heal? Ultimately, Teitel’s conceptualization
indicates that the only acceptable transitional justice mechanisms are legal ones which
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problematically asserts that non-judicial mechanisms are not as effective. However, when faced
with the obstruction of formal transitional justice mechanisms, such as legal ones, non-judicial
mechanisms prove to be the only other option. Furthermore, when used in tandem, both judicial
and non-judicial mechanisms can be used to best heal the nation.

III. Conceptualizing Transitional Justice as Two Pillars
One of the most utilized conceptualizations of transitional justice comes from the U.N.
Secretary General's 2004 Report on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and
Post-conflict Societies, which asserts that:
“The notion of transitional justice discussed in the present report comprises the full range
of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a
legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and
achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms,
with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual
prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a
combination thereof” (United Nations Secretary General 2004).

The U.N.’s definition well articulates the importance of both non-judicial and judicial
mechanisms, thus seeming to assert these as the two pillars of transitional justice, and nicely
defines the goals of the process. It also articulates that the goals of transitional justice remain
multifaceted. Their definition concretely states the goals of transitional justice as, “society’s
attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (United Nations Secretary General
2004). Here we see accountability, justice, and reconciliation highlighted as the main goals. The
U.N.’s definition helps us to understand the variety of mechanisms that can be used to achieve
justice, thus supporting the idea that the “ideal justice” Teitel refers to goes beyond that of
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simply legal processes. As such, providing recognition for victims emerges as an extension of
justice sought to be achieved. Pablo de Greiff writes that, “First, it can be said that all transitional
justice measures seek to provide recognition to victims” (De Greiff 2012). Transitional justice is
not just about punishing those who committed human rights violations but is also about ensuring
that the victims are heard. When looking at transitional justice mechanisms, we see specific ones
created to ensure this. Truth commissions, for example, do not aim to prosecute the abusers but
rather provide an opportunity for the victims to be heard. This can be an important part of
transitional justice especially if there has been a history of ignoring or hiding the suffering that
was endured. As such, recognition of victims is a form of reconstructing the public narrative and
memory through the search for truth. De Greiff goes on to say that, “What is indispensable, and
what arguably transitional justice measures have sought to accomplish, is to recognize that the
other is the bearer of rights—and therefore to engage in modes of redress that can not only
assuage suffering but also restore the rights that were so brutally violated and affirm victims'
standing as full citizens” (De Greiff 2012). Not only is recognition of the abuse that victims went
through important to other goals such as achieving justice, reconciliation and establishing truth,
but it is also a way of giving victims back their rights. In order to understand what other
non-judicial mechanisms can possibly be utilized, we turn to two popular alternatives to legal
mechanisms, truth commissions and reparations.

Truth Commissions
Archbishop Desmond Tutu referred to truth commissions as the “third way”- an option
that could be used as an alternative to prosecution and amnesty (Chapman and Ball 2001). First
used in Uganda in 1974, but popularized for their use in Argentina in the 1983 CONADEP
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Report, Nunca Más, truth commissions differ from trials both in their purpose and their
execution (Lessa 2013). The purpose of truth commissions is, “to provide an authoritative
account of a specific period or regime, determine the major causes of the violence, and make
recommendations about measures to undertake so as to avoid a repetition in the future”
(Chapman and Ball 2001). Truth commissions became popular as a method of transitional justice
because of their ability to give voice to many, something that is often unachievable through trials
which have historically been more limited and have not found success for all victims, as seen in
the case of the Nazi crimes, for example, in which roughly 6,500 cases of the 90,000 cases
brought forward resulted in convictions (Chapman and Ball 2001). The use of truth commissions
thus questions the expansion of our definition of justice beyond legal realms. As de Grieff writes,
“Truth-telling exercises...show that justice is not simply a call for insight but also a call to act on
the truths disclosed” (De Grieff 2012). There is a certain type of justice that is argued to be
gained through truth commissions- that is a form of personal justice. Hinton writes, “The
recovery of language and the retelling of the experiences are forms of restoration and retribution
that are emotionally and politically rewarding” (Hinton 2010). Truth commissions themselves
can vary in terms of format and duration, for example, but ultimately:
“These bodies share four characteristics: they focus on the past; they investigate a pattern
of abuses over a period of time—rather than a specific event—while attempting to sketch
the overall picture; they are temporary bodies, existing for a limited, predefined, period of
time, and cease to function upon submission of the final report; and they are officially
sanctioned and established by states or international organizations in order to have greater
access to information” (Hayner 2001).
Truth commissions not only shape a public narrative, but provide individual and personal justice
for victims of abuse, thus expanding what one may typically associate with the acquisition of
justice.
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Reparations
Another non-judicial mechanism that is a part of transitional justice, broadly understood,
is reparations. Reparations can take many forms. The 2004 U.N. Report states that, “Indeed, in
the face of widespread human rights violations, States have the obligation to act not only against
perpetrators, but also on behalf of victims - including through the provision of reparations”
(United Nations Secretary General 2004). Reparations fall into one of two categories. They can
take material form, such as that of monetary payment, and, as Lessa writes, “constitute a form of
compensation” (Lessa 2013). They can also be symbolic, such as creating days of remembrance,
constructing memorials, or work to impact collective memory and social consciousness, such as
working to rewrite history texts and reform education (Rhot-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006).
Naomi Rhot-Arriaza warns against the pitfalls of using reparations, “to stigmatize and
marginalize those groups whose members perpetrated the abuse,” and thus argues that they, “...
must be offered in ways that acknowledge the suffering of victims but do not victimize others
who did not actively engage in the violence” (Rhot-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006).
Ultimately, reparations must work to give victims back what they may have lost, and, because of
the varying abuse and experiences of victims and countries, forms of reparations may, and
should, also vary case to case. Ellen Lutz writes that, “reparations processes, to the extent that
they aim to remedy past harms, are also past-focused” (Rhot-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006).
While reparations do work to respond to past suffering, symbolic forms of reparations, such as
the creation of memorials and the rewriting of history, I believe can work in tandem to also
prevent future atrocity.
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IV. The Need to Conceptualize Broadly
While I have previously explained the pitfall in Teitel’s argument that asserts that there is
an “ideal justice” that can be found through legal practices, the most significant error in her
argument is the de-emphasis of non-judicial mechanisms through this language. While Teitel
takes issue with their operation outside of the rule of law and their lack of legal accountability,
this ignores the potential for non-judicial mechanisms to achieve justice, offer remembrance, and
achieve accountability when formal processes may be blocked. Thus, we see the need to
conceptualize transitional justice in broader terms.

One-Size-Fits All
At times, it appears as if transitional justice is offered as a “one-size-fits-all” solution.
While this could also be argued as a pitfall of narrower conceptions too, this suggestion, of
course, ignores the diversity and complexity of each individual case and country. It is important
to evaluate each situation separately, knowing that there is of course a normative standard that
can be followed, but that the approaches, and combination of approaches, may vary depending
on the case. In regards to what measures to take, the 2004 U.N. report states that:
we must assess myriad factors, such as the nature of the underlying conflict, the will of
the parties, any history of widespread abuse, the identification of vulnerable groups, such
as minorities and displaced persons, the situation and role of women, the situation of
children, rule of law implications of peace agreements and the condition and nature of the
country’s legal system, traditions and institutions'' (United Nations Secretary General
2004).
Each of these factors will vary by country and weighing their importance is essential to
understanding the conflict as well as needs for overcoming such conflict. Juan Méndez notes
that, “If mechanisms and actions, including their sequencing and timing, depend heavily on
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context and circumstance, it follows that what has worked in one country may fail in another”
(Méndez 2009). A variety of factors, including when, where, and what mechanisms are
implemented, impacts the overall effectiveness of transitional justice. Ultimately, acknowledging
that practices should vary country to country, while operating with a standard set of goals, is the
optimal framework to provide a process that best accommodates each country’s unique situation,
culture, and people.

In Search of the Perfect Model
All of this suggests that there is no perfect model of transitional justice. When
approaching the study and practice of transitional justice, it is key that we remember it is not a
perfected process. Pablo de Greiff writes:
...there is no country that has undergone a transition that has prosecuted each and every
perpetrator of human rights violations (let alone punished them in proportion to the gravity of the
harms they caused); that has implemented a truth-seeking strategy that disclosed the fate of each
and every victim or thoroughly identified the structures that made the violations possible; that
has established a reparations program providing each and every victim with benefits proportional
to the harm he or she suffered; or that, particularly in the short run, has reformed each and every
institution that was implicated in the violations in question (De Grieff 2012).

As will be discussed later in the paper, there is no one perfect example which can be used as a
blueprint for future cases. This is not to say that there haven’t necessarily been countries that
have successfully undergone a process of transitional justice, but rather that no country has
achieved an ideal resolution. Ultimately, the lack of a perfect model also likely speaks to the idea
of there not being a one-size-fits-all solution, knowing that every country will vary in terms of
what they need based on their situation, as has been previously discussed.
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Michael Humphrey wrote that “‘Transitional justice’ has been a strategy to manage
‘political transition’ which suggests duration, process and destination. As a consequence the
study of transitional justice has usually been framed as a dramatic, temporary and transformative
event” (Humphrey 2008). This can be problematic as this process to justice can be interpreted as
linear and finite. But, as we have learned through the transitional justice processes of past cases,
it can take years to complete the process of transitional justice, and some of these processes, and
likely the best, may require continuous reflection. Additionally, by suggesting there is a set
duration, I fear that this also may lead to the idea that transitional justice must occur at a certain
point after atrocity, eliminating the possibility of beginning or returning to a state of transitional
justice that may be necessary for truly achieving the goals of the process.

Conclusion:
The rise and normalization of the practice of transitional justice has simultaneously led to a
vibrant debate regarding how we should conceptualize transitional justice. It is here that we see
the discrepancy between narrower conceptions of transitional justice as a set of legal practices
emerge, as seen through the particular lens of Ruti Teitel’s conceptualization of the practice. This
conceptualization, however, dangerously asserts that there is an “ideal justice” that can only be
achieved through law, ultimately undermining the multidimensionality of justice. We thus begin
to see how essential non-judicial mechanisms of transitional justice are in that they provide
justice for victims in ways that legal practices may not be able to achieve. Furthermore, when
considering the reality that these specific transitional justice mechanisms may be blocked, we
must consider other ways in which a country can attempt to both push for these formal processes
as well as engage in transitional justice outside of institutional and legal mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 2: Argentina
On the afternoon of April 30, 1977, a group of mothers gathered in Buenos Aires’ Plaza
de Mayo searching for their children, a direct confrontation of the military Junta that had been
terrorizing the country since 1975 (Goñi 2017). What began as a small group of middle-aged
women marching around the Plaza, holding signs and pictures of their missing children, turned
into one of the most famous human rights organizations: The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo.
Every Thursday since this day, the Mothers march around the Plaza, bringing visibility to their
cause and creating a new method of political challenge: the defense of human rights (Dávila
2013). More than 40 years and over 2,000 marches later, the Mothers remain active and represent
innovation in the area of human rights when faced with terror and impunity (Goñi 2017).
Argentina was overcome by a dictatorship that committed human rights abuses at the
most serious and repressive of levels. The Junta, which called itself the National Reorganization
Process, or “El Proceso,” began a period of terror in the country referred to as the “Dirty War”
(Dávila 2013). The reference to this period as the Dirty War has itself been a point of contention,
with some arguing that this inaccurate naming shifts the focus again away from the truth- that the
actions taken were state-sponsored terrorism. The actions of the Proceso created a wound in the
country that demanded attention. While the official CONADEP report, Nunca Más, estimated the
disappearance of 8,960 people, today’s estimates believe this figure to be around 30,000 people
(Sikkink 2011). Of those, thousands were subject to torture and placed in detention centres
across the country. How does a nation heal after experiencing such atrocity? Argentina made a
clear and conscious choice to directly confront this past immediately following their
re-democratization by engaging in a formal process of transitional justice, including The Trial of
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the Junta and the creation of the Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas
(CONADEP 1984). While their formal approaches were innovative and drew world-wide praise
and recognition, Argentina’s process was not without its problems. After initial successes, the
process of transitional justice came to an abrupt stop, ushering in a period of impunity. It was
only after the work of human rights activists’ efforts to confront this impunity that they engaged
in an informal process of transitional justice that simultaneously pushed forward a return to
formal transitional justice by the state. Given the crucial role that activists played in reinstituting
the transitional justice measures, a critical analysis of their active participation in the country’s
process of confronting this past becomes necessary to understanding Argentina’s fragmented
process of transitional justice.
Kathryn Sikkink wrote in her book The Justice Cascade that, “Some aspects of the
political context within Argentina made it possible for Argentines to innovate in the area of
human rights and transitional justice. The first of these is the level of repression. As Sikkink
insightfully notes, “The Argentine case was unique in that the repression was extreme, but not so
extreme as to eliminate all possibilities for activism” (Sikkink 2011, 137). Thus, this chapter
aims to uncover the truth, illustrating what made the Argentine case of transitional justice
particularly brutal but not so repressresive as to block the opportunity for innovative practices by
human right activists and organizations. I will proceed by exploring what made this dictatorship
particularly inhumane through an analysis of the innovative actions of repression the military
dictatorship employed during the Dirty War. Through an uncovery of the events leading up to the
dictatorship, followed by an examination of the abuses that occurred during this period, I will
theorize how this trauma came to exist and why it required significant response. I will then turn
to an analysis of the formal transitional mechanisms the government took after the transition to
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democracy. This section will conclude with an analysis of the role human rights activists played
both inside and outside of these formal processes. I will ultimately argue that the Argentine case
demonstrates that human rights activists both work to actively push forward formal mechanisms
of transitional justice and play a crucial role in holding individuals accountable in informal, but
effective, ways. In doing so, human rights activists themselves contribute informally to the
process of transitional justice.
To elaborate these points, I will first provide a summary of Argentina’s political make-up
prior to the Dirty War, focusing on what specific factors may have accounted for the brutality of
this regime. I will then provide details on what specifically happened during the dictatorship,
focusing on the tactics the regime used against the people by drawing on the CONADEP Nunca
Más report. The chapter will then shift its focus to look at the process of transitional justice that
the country underwent upon re-democratization, specifically focusing on the role of human rights
activist groups, such as the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, The Center for Legal Studies (CELS),
and the escrache movement.

Part I. Pre-Dictatorship
After Argentina gained its independence from Spain in the 19th century, it created a
constitution in 1860, resulting in the formation of, “stable institutions that fostered economic
growth, urbanization, and high immigration for five decades” (Speck 1987). As a country, the
independent Argentina, which was then called the Argentine Confederation, prospered (Speck
1987). Its renewed relationship with Great Britain resulted in significant economic wealth and
social stability beginning in the end of the 19th century that carried Argentina into the 20th
century (Romero 2002). During this time, Argentina attempted to solidify these newly emergent
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democratic institutions which, “fostered economic growth, urbanization, and high immigration
for five decades” (Speck 1987, 495). This period was also characterized by what has been
considered the first democratic election of President Hipolito Yrigoyen in 1916 (Romero 2002).
The rise of public schools, as well President Yrigoyen’s backing of the University reform in
1918, which expanded university access to those beyond the elite, helped to dampen
dissatisfaction by attempting to increase equity and opportunity amongst social classes (Romero
2002). The harsh reality of the Great Depression resulted in unrest and revealed the weakness of
the Republic (Speck 1987). As such, this period of transition resulted in another episode of
strikes and civil unrest that were met with military repression beginning in 1930 (Romero 2002).
In 1930, President Yrigoyen was overthrown by armed forces which, “constituted a turning point
in politics, marking the start of increasing military involvement in political life, along with rising
social, economic, and political instability” (Lessa 2013, 32). This was the first of five military
dictatorships that plagued Argentina during the 20th century (Dávila 2013). The following years
replicated a similar pattern in which moments of stability were met with unrest. As Francesca
Lessa writes, “Thereafter, Argentine politics became an alternation between authoritarian rule
and democratic administrations—the latter often mere transitional spells in between military
regimes” (Lessa 2013, 32).
In 1943, the country, which was suffering as a result of the Great Depression, had its
civilian regime overthrown by a group of military conspirators that included Juan Domingo
Péron (Speck 1987). Perón proved to be one of the most influential politicians in Argentine
history, eventually being elected as President when the regime transitioned back to civilian rule
in 1946 (Dávila 2013). The Peronist government was unique in that it, “restructured and
expanded the state, promoted social and economic modernisation, endorsed cultural renovation
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and, through a strong nationalistic and anti-oligarchic discourse, [and] gained the overwhelming
support of the working class” (Milanesio 2014, 84). Perón’s utilization of publicity, placing a
strong emphasis on the values of masculinity and patriotism, led to the formation of an identity
that greatly resonated with the lower classes and cemented his continued influence, ultimately
giving birth to what came to be known as “Peronism” (Milanesio 2014). By promoting
anti-elitism and supporting industry, Peronism gave political identity through his support of
working-class Argentines. This can be best explained not only through his policies, many of
which aimed to strengthen and protect the working-class, but also through his public image
(Milanesio 2014). Opting for more informal, working class attire, Perón appealed to the
working-class by dressing like them, directly rejecting the pretentiousness normally embraced by
politicians (Milanesio 2014). On this, Natalia Milensio noted that, “While addressing his
supporters on 17 October 1945, Peron solemnly declared, ‘I am putting away the sacred and
honourable uniform I received from the fatherland to wear the civilian’s shirt and merge with the
suffering and sweaty masses who work to produce the country’s wealth’” (Milanesio 2014, 92).
While Perón was influential as a politician during his time, his ultimate founding of an entire
political ideology significantly shaped the county’s political landscape. While Perón greatly
impacted politics and, in many ways, cemented a sense of democracy amongst Argentine society,
he, “simultaneously...created a police state; political opponents were persecuted, tortured, and
killed; corruption was unchecked and the judicial system was dismantled” (Lessa 2013, 32).
Péron was ousted from power in 1955, and between 1955 and 1983, Argentina entered an
18-year period that was characterized by three separate military dictatorships, the last of which
being the Proceso (Dávila 2013). The lead-up to this final dictatorship was filled with turbulence
and instability. The first military dictatorship ended in 1958 and was followed by a period of
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civilian rule (Dávila 2013). This, however, was halted by another dictatorship in 1966, called the
Argentine Revolution, and, “was a political turn that both shaped and foreshadowed the Proceso
a decade later” (Dávila 2013, 63). During this period of rapid turnover between civilian
governments and junta regimes, the nation’s economy suffered. Up until the 1930s, the French
described those with incredible wealth as ‘‘riche comme un Argentin’,’ (“rich like an
Argentine”), but when faced with changing policies and models, the country soon found itself
experiencing painful economic stagnation and limited annual growth by 1970 (Dávila 2013,
Glaeser et. al. 2017, 2). On this point, Jerry Dávila writes, “The real problem of Argentine
business in the 1960s was not, strictly speaking, a shortage of capital, but a lack of willingness to
invest” (Dávila 2013, 63). Instability plagued the period of the so-called Argentine Revolution,
and a return to civilian rule came in 1973. Péron ultimately returned to Argentina and was
re-elected as President in 1974. At first, “Even many of Péron’s critics held out hope that the
return of Péron might heal the growing social and political chasm in Argentina'' (Dávila 2013,
73). However, once in power, Péron was unable to unite the left and the right and allowed
violence to escalate in the country, including violence perpetrated by the government forces
(Dávila 2013). Only nine months after assuming his Presidency, Péron died, leaving his wife
Isabel to become President.
The economic and social insecurity that threatened the nation also led to the rise and the
initial public acceptance of the dictatorship. As described by Sikkink, “the period just preceding
the military coup in 1976 [was remembered] as a time of violence and chaos, when many
members of the elite feared that they would be kidnapped by left-wing guerrillas for ransom, or
that a bomb would explode in their children’s school” (Sikkink 2011, 104). On March 24, 1976,
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the Argentine military junta successfully executed a coup d’etat, ending Isabel Perón’s
presidency and beginning what would be eight years of a terror-driven dictatorship.

Part II. The Dictatorship and “Dirty War”
On March 24th, 1976, the military coup offered this proclamation to the people of
Argentina: “The Armed Forces have taken control of the Republic. The entire country must
understand the deep and unequivocal meaning of this fact so that collective responsibility and
effort support this endeavor that, in pursuit of the common good, will – with the help of God bring the full recuperation of the nation” (Finchelstein 2014, 125). The Junta, which was
composed of the heads of the three branches of the armed forces, forcefully detained President
Isabel Perón and seized control of the country (Dávila 2013). While this was to be Argentina’s
third military government since 1955, this regime differed from the start (Dávila 2013). This day
marked the end of democracy in the country for 8 years and the beginning of a brutal
dictatorship.
On the first day of power, the Junta announced plans for the Process of National
Reorganization, the Proceso (Dávila 2013). This process was warranted in the eyes of the Junta,
General Viola stating that they needed to halt the attempts at a “total modification of the Nation’s
political, social and economic structures according to their materialist, atheist and totalitarian
conception” (Finchelstein 2014, 126). The Junta’s dismissal of all government officials and
subsequent appointment of military officers to these positions was politically strategic (Dávila
2013). Not only did it help to protect the power of the Junta by ensuring their most fervent
supporters were in positions of power, but this overhaul also represented a symbolic promise of
change (Dávila 2013). The changes made by the new Junta Regime came fast; the same day of
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the coup, they suspended the constitutional rights of the people, including the right to protest and
assemble (Dávila 2013). Despite these warning signs of impending state abuse, many Argentines
viewed the coup and subsequent regime as a needed change. The years of instability and
hardship the country had faced, as previously discussed, resulted in many people welcoming the
Proceso with relief. Of those particularly happy with this change were wealthy Argentines.
Jonathan Kandell described a party hosted by wealthy Argentine’s the weekend after the coup,
writing, “This was the first weekend after the military coup, and the collapse of the
three-year-old Peronist government gave a special glow to the sumptuous dinner parties that still
made upper-class Argentines the social lions of Latin America” (Dávila 2013, 113).
The Junta’s appeal to God made this characterization of the enemy particularly powerful.
Their assertion that they were up against “an enemy without faith, without patria and without
God,” made their fight limitless and morally defensible (Finchelstein 2014, 127). This
additionally aided in the ideological acceptance of the Junta’s actions by the public. As
Finchelstein writes, “The notion that the criminal acts of repression and murder were in fact a
“holy war” was tightly bound to the idea of purifying sacrifice. Priests like the Archbishop of
Paraná, Victoria Bonamín, justified the repression, calling it “a blood bath” and maintaining that
the function of the Army was to “atone for our country's impurity” (Finchelstein 2014, 128).
Viewing the efforts of the Junta as safeguarding the country from communism, the Church
denied abuses even when victims were members of the clergy (Dávila 2013). The dissemination
of a narrative based in an ideology that claimed to be protecting the state from enemies of God
created a framework that made the use of repression and abuse limitless. Moreover, the use of
this narrative paired with support of a moral institution, The Argentine Church, only allowed the
Junta to maintain and expand their power even more easily.
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Abuses Committed by the Junta Regime
The abuses committed during the dictatorship were so extensive that public
understanding and recognition of the full extent of the events were both difficult to grasp and to
accept. This was in part due to how widespread the abuse was and the uniqueness of the terror
methods utilized. As Kathryn Sikkink writes,
This massive and systematic use of disappearances was itself a repressive “innovation”
on the part of the Argentine armed forces. Disappearances had been used elsewhere,
including Nazi Germany; Guatemala during the counterinsurgency war of the late 1960s;
and Chile under Pinochet. Nevertheless, the Argentine case marked the most widespread
and systematic contemporary use of the practice (Sikkink 2011, 107).
The use of terror also allowed the Junta to maintain control over the public. While the
government did not own up to many of the abuses committed, the clandestine nature of their
abuses being a key characteristic of the regime, they did ensure that fear was incited among the
public.
It is important to understand the significance of the information that is to follow. This
information is only available to the public due to the creation of the CONADEP and the Nunca
Más report that was produced in 1984. The report begins with the statement, “Many of the events
described in this report will be hard to believe” (CONADEP 1984). The report combines
statistical estimates with powerful victim testimony and it is nothing short of heartbreaking.
However, acknowledging the abuse that occurred helps us to uncover the characteristics of this
case as well as further understand why the dictatorship created such wounds that required
addressment through transitional justice mechanisms. While abuses occurred in varying forms, I
will focus on the most prevalent forms of abuse, that being abduction, torture, and the use of
secret detention centers.
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Abductions:
After the 1976 coup, the CONADEP Nunca Más Report estimated that, “eight thousand,
nine hundred and sixty of them have not reappeared to this day” (CONADEP 1984). Today, this
number is understood to be closer to 30,000 (Sikkink 2011). The use of abduction as a method of
repression was first tested during Operation Independence (“Independencia'') before the regime
came to power (CONADEP 1984). Unlike large-scale abductions, the Nunca Más report notes
that, “It differs from the methods used in other countries because it was carried out in total
secrecy, with regard to a person’s arrest, disappearance, and the persistent official refusal to
admit responsibility. This repression took place over an extended period and affected the whole
nation” (CONADEP 1984). While the public was well aware that people were disappearing, the
lack of ownership over these disappearances by the government, as well as the dead-end
investigations that would follow, only created a heightened sense of fear and frustration in the
community. At the same time, a direct lack of ownership by the government only further allowed
deniers of governmental wrongdoing to maintain this position.
The testimony of Lucio Ramon Perez, who provided details on the kidnapping of his
brother on November 9, 1976, illustrates common characteristics associated with abductions
during the dictatorship. The Nunca Más report includes his following account:
He was asleep with his wife and five-year-old son when they were wakened at about 2
a.m. by a loud explosion. My brother got out of bed, opened the front door, and saw four
people jumping over the fence.
They were in civilian clothes; one of them had a moustache and a jersey wrapped round
his head like a turban; they all carried rifles, Three of them burst into the flat and ordered
my sister-in-law and the boy not to look. The neighbours say that two of them dragged
out my brother and forced him into a Ford Falcon. That’s the last we heard of him. They
also say there were several cars and a truck on the scene, and there were a lot of men with

Sinatra 33
rifles behind the trees. The traffic had been halted, and a helicopter was circling over the
house (CONADEP 1984).
Perez’s account provides important insight into norms associated with abductions during this
time. Firstly, his brother’s abduction occurred at night, falling into the majority statistic in which
62% of abductions were found to occur at night (CONADEP 1984). The explosion that was
heard was also not out of the ordinary and was likely intended to intimidate and demonstrate the
power of the Junta. The high number of people involved in the raid, who were both armed and
disguised, was also not uncommon. Part of what aided in the anonymity of the government in
terms of their involvement with abductions was their use of non-governmental workers in
carrying out the physical acts of abducting. Instead, a task force of gang members, called a
patota, was used for this limited purpose (Dávila 2013). The use of weaponry was also important
to note, the report stating that, “The members of the gang always had with them a weaponry that
was totally disproportionate to the supposed threat posed by the victims” (CONADEP 1984).
Again, this quote helps us to understand that every attempt was made to intimidate victims and
the surrounding community. In the case of Perez, this attempt to invoke fear becomes especially
noticeable with the stopping of the traffic and the circling of the helicopter above, indicating that
not only were they trying to invoke fear in the victim, but also in that of the community
(CONADEP 1984). Perez’s brother’s abduction having taken place in Temperley, a province of
Buenos Aires, illustrates the common use of disguise in areas in which abductors feared
revealing their identity. As is true in the case of Perez’s brother, abductors attempted to preserve
their anonymity in fear of possible recognition through the use of a makeshift turban to cover
their hair and what was likely a fake mustache. The forcing of Perez’s brother into a Ford Falcon
was also a common vehicle used to transport victims; these cars were usually unmarked, private,
or cars thought to be unrecognizable (Carey 2012, CONADEP 1984). Ultimately, the abduction
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of Perez’s brother represents multiple common characteristics of abductions that occurred and
helps to especially illustrate the reality that fear was not only intended to be imposed on the
intended victim, but also on the neighbors and the community at large.
One may question why the police did not prevent these abductions. The “green light” was
what allowed this: a phrase used to describe an agreement made between the police and those
perpetrating the crime (CONADEP 1984). This “green light” ensured that the police would not
get involved during a certain period of time, thus allowing the abductors to carry out their abuse
(CONADEP 1984). Should an onlooker report the incident, the police would simply respond:
“that the Police were aware of what was going on, but could do nothing” (CONADEP 1984).
This helps us to understand how so many were also abducted during the day, as the area had been
pre-cleared and the police were not going to arrive, or act, should they be called upon, only
further invoking fear among the citizens.
Ultimately, the actual abduction of the victim was only the beginning of the abuse for
both the victim and for the family. Impacts on the family as a result of the abductions were
devastating. Beyond potentially losing a relative, other family members may have been taken as
hostages, their possessions stolen, children left orphaned, and the pain often only just beginning
as many were left without answers as to what happened to their loved ones (CONADEP 1984).
Sometimes, torture and interrogation began in the home of the victim with the family sometimes
in the house forced to listen or watch (CONADEP 1984). For those abducted, they were either
disappeared or sent to a detention center, torture often associated with both of these possible
fates.

Torture
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Torture was a horrible accompaniment to many of the abuses; the Nunca Más report cites
that torture was an aspect of nearly all cases the Commission received. In looking at the
techniques utilized in collective and individual cases, the report states that it appears like “an
encyclopedia of horror” (CONADEP 1984). In looking at the Nunca Más report’s account of
torture, they include an interesting statement describing, “Lastly, we are well aware of, and
share, the feeling of dismay which the bald narration we set down here will arouse in torture
victims and their families, who were made to suffer so much. We know only too well the anguish
that a detailed knowledge of this barbarity causes” (CONADEP 1984). This statement
encompasses a multitude of important points. Firstly, it references the shock of these cases. It is
difficult for the public to learn about a truth that they previously turned a blind eye to, attempted
to forget, and in some cases, helped to facilitate. However, this also highlights the difficulty on
part of the victims in sharing these details. Ultimately, this helps us to see how the abuse did not
simply end with the dictatorship, but rather that the effects of the abuse persist for incredible
lengths of time and extend beyond the physical pain victims endured.
The torture that was performed was in part what made the case of Argentina so unique as,
“widespread use of different forms of torture is particularly frightening because of the perverse
imagination demonstrated, and the character of the people who carried it out, as well as of those
who supported its use and employed it as a means to an end” (CONADEP 1984). Reading the
accounts of torture is difficult to digest. The report contains first-hand accounts of torture
endured, including that of Dr. Noberto Liwsky. Dr. Liwsky’s multi-paragraph account highlights
numerous commonalities torture victims endured. One of these is the deprivation of senses,
particularly that of sight. This normally begins immediately after kidnapping and continues
throughout time after, such as during the time spent in a detention center.
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The torture techniques used also varied. They included electrocution, beatings, non-fatal
shooting, rape, and mutilation/pain through the use of torture weapons and tools (CONADEP
1984). Psychological torture was also common, and in many ways equally, if not more, painful.
Dr. Noberto Liwsky’s testimony is included in the report, and recounts:
At one point when I was face-down on the torture table, they lifted my head then
removed my blindfold to show me a bloodstained rag. They asked me if I recognized it
and, without waiting for a reply - impossible anyway because it was unrecognizable, and
my eyesight was very badly affected - they told me it was a pair of my wife’s knickers.
No other explanation was given, so that I would suffer all the more ... then they
blindfolded me again and carried on with their beating (CONADEP 1984).
Captors would wear clothing and other items that belonged to the victims or their family
members as a form of psychological torture, reminding them of their lack of power and on-going
abuse (Dávila 2013). Torture, while sometimes occurring at the time of the abduction or
immediately leading up to the disappearance, was most frequently perpetrated in the secret
detention centers.

Detention Centers
As Jerry Dávila writes, “The clandestine detention centers were sites where every form of
degradation imaginable was carried out” (Dávila 2013, 119). Approximately 340 secret detention
centers were scattered throughout the country in which an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 Argentines
were detained over the course of the dictatorship (Dávila 2013, CONADEP 1984). These
detention centers were truly just warehouses of torture and abuse. They utilized anything they
could to inflict both physical and psychological abuse. As described by Dávila, “rape was
systematic” and utilized to degrade and dehumanize victims (Dávila 2013, 119). Kathryn Sikkink
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includes the account of Pablo Díaz, a student activist who was kidnapped and brought to a
detention center. In her book The Justice Cascade, she writes:
In the courtroom during the first weeks of the trial, he explained that at his kidnapping he
was taken from his home blindfolded, thrown to the floor of a car on top of another
prisoner, and driven to a secret detention center. When they were questioning him, they
said they were going to “put him on the machine.” Thinking they meant a lie detector, he
said “good,” because it would convince them he was telling the truth. He discovered “the
machine” meant torture with an electric prod; when they applied it to his lips and gums,
and his genitals, he could smell the odor of burning flesh. They kept asking him for the
names of his classmates in the group. Later, they tortured him again. He was close to
fainting when he felt a terrible pain in his foot; it was his toenail being pulled out with
pliers. The pain was so extreme that he asked them to kill him (Sikkink 2011, 125).

While torture was a main component of the detention centers, the general dehumanization that
was associated with time in the detention centers, in which victims were treated and considered
subhuman, was what made these centers particularly terrifying. Additionally, the Nunca Más
report cites that one-third of those disappeared were women, some of whom were pregnant. The
Junta had a plan for these women that gave birth in captivity. As Jerry Dávila writes, “Pregnant
detainees were held until they gave birth, often at the Campo de Mayo military hospital, and then
disappeared” (Dávila 2013, 119). Their children, however, were often given to high-ranking
military families and their former identities erased (CONADEP 1984, Lessa 2013, Dávila 2013).
Here, we see the emergence of another abuse, the kidnapping and systematic trafficking of
generations of children taken from their family and unknowingly placed elsewhere.

The Appearance of a Human Rights Movement: The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo
As described by Jerry Dávila, “On its face, the Mothers were not political at all, though in
reality they mounted the most direct political challenge the regime could face” (Dávila 2013,
122). While the regime prohibited the right to protest, the Madres drew on the appeal to their

Sinatra 38
traditional role: being a caring parent in search of their child (Longoni 2010). Rather than
directly accuse the Proceso of disappearing their children, by seeking out their loved ones they
engaged in a form of protest that harnessed their traditional family identity (Dávila 2013). In
their early days, the Madres drew on the use of family photos, wearing them as they stood in the
plaza, bringing them to official visits, and displaying them on posters (Longoni 2010). As Ana
Longoni wrote, “In this way, the Mothers inaugurated a prolific genealogy for the public use of
photography in the struggle of the human rights movement against the official denial of the
killings (Longoni 2010, 6). The use of photographs reaffirmed the existence of the disappeared,
giving them a name, a face, and an identity that were powerfully juxtaposed with the living proof
of the loved one they left behind (Longoni 2010). In this sense, the use of photograph in the
human rights movement, as specifically utilized by that of the Madres, transformed the use of
photograph from an heirloom to that of a catalyst for change. While the photographs represented
the individual, depicting the face of the disappeared, by being worn in a collective space, Madres
showed the sheer volume of the disappeared, thus representing a collective identity and not just
an individual one (Langoni 2010). Furthermore, as is described by Langoni, “the photograph also
condensed in an image the reason for the Madres’ being there, and (re)generated the bond
between those who dared to demonstrate in the midst of terror” (Langoni 2010, 6). In this sense,
the Madres’ use of their loved ones’ photographs further protected them and their efforts by
reaffirming their purpose and role.
The establishment of the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo during the dictatorship represented
both an innovative approach to seeking out justice despite their significant limitations as well as
the inability for the regime to fully repress the will of the people. Through the proliferation of
their image, as seen through the use of photographs as well as their collective body that occupied
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the Plaza, the Madres “impos[ed] a different reality” by emphasizing the circumstance of the
kidnapping and disappearances that was occurring in the country (Longoni 5, 2010). While the
Madres did more than utilize photographs, including working with international organizations
and attempting to utilize judicial systems, we can begin to see how their influence began during
the dictatorship. During this period, they both introduced a new form of protest to the country
and brought local, regional, and international attention to the state of Argentina.
The Siluetazo was an artistic tactic created by Rodolfo Aguerreberry, Julio Flores, and
Guillermo Kexel that was also adopted by the Mothers and their “sister group,” The
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, along with other human rights activists (Longoni 2010). Its
rise to public use has been pinpointed to September 21, 1983- during the dictatorship (Longoni
2010). Longoni writes that, “The Siluetazo was an event in the fullest sense of the word: an
exceptional moment in history in which artistic initiative coincided with demand coming out of
social movements, and which gained momentum thanks to the support of a multitude” (Longoni
2010, 9). Gathering in Plaza de Mayo, people volunteered their bodies to be traced onto posters
or the ground. They thus harnessed an artistic expression normally utilized by children to serve
as a conduit for social change, visually representing those who have been purposefully
disappeared by the government (Longoni 2010). While activists would then demonstrate by
holding the silhouette, some of which were personalized to reflect the disappeared, they would
also be placed around the city, extending the visibility of the disappeared by making them a part
of the public space (Longoni 2010). As Buntinx says, the Siluetazo “gives participants a new,
autonomous, and collective consciousness at the same time” (Longoni 2010). While the use of
silhouettes, “are often understood as the visual manifestation of the slogan ‘Aparición con vida’
(‘Appearing alive’) that the Mothers chanted from 1980,” the practice was disseminated across
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the country, without official ties to the original artists or groups at times, thus pointing to its more
universal application as a human rights activist tool in visually providing a certain type of
personal and collective justice (Longoni 2010, 11).
The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo were a part of a larger movement occurring both
domestically and abroad regarding the state of human rights in Argentina. This human rights
movement relied on pressure from international entities, perhaps the most influential being that
of the Vatican. As The Argentine Church began to face scrutiny by the Vatican due to the rise in
international recognition of human rights abuses in the country, actions that the Vatican took held
significant weight (Dávila 2013). Most notably, Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, a human rights leader
and activist who was detained and tortured by the regime, received a papal commendation after
having received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1980, clearly indicating the Vatican’s support for the
human rights movement in the country (Dávila 2013). Additionally, both the support given by
the Pope and Esquivel’s receiving of the Nobel Peace Prize represented “an act that intensified
international pressure on the Junta, which in turn prevented Argentine media from reporting on
Esquivel’s address when he accepted the prize” (Dávila 2013, 123). The rise of the human rights
movement during the dictatorship brought considerable state and international attention to the
issues at hand, ultimately pressuring the Junta and setting the stage for justice to come. We thus
began to see how human rights activists and organizations, like the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo,
deployed tactics that resulted in significant visibility, the mobilization of a movement, and began
to inspire change, as will be seen later in the chapter.

III. The End of the Junta Regime
The military dictatorship finally came to an end in December 1983 (Dávila 2013, 135).
After suffering the loss of the Falklands War against the British, the former heads of the Proceso
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were quick to resign. The regime began efforts to transition back to civilian rule; the success of
the Junta was clearly no longer viable (Dávila 135). The state held their first free democratic
election since the election of Juan Péron in 1973 and Raul Alfonsín was elected as President in
1983 (Dávila 2013).
As Lessa notes, “Conventional accounts of the Argentine transition use as their starting
point the loss of the Falklands War in June 1982” (Lessa 2013, 43). While many have noted the
relationship between that of the regime’s collapse and the loss of the Falklands War, also known
as the Malvinas War, I follow the argument of Sikkink and argue that this relationship should be
assessed with caution (Sikkink 2011). While Lessa claims that this war “signaled the beginning
of the end,” a closer examination of the time period instead hints at the end truly beginning
around 1980 in which, “consensus regarding critical ideas and strategies of governing
disappeared,” as argued by Pion-berlin (Lessa 2013, Pion-Berlin 1985, 72). The assertion that the
war over the Falkland Islands indicated the beginning dangerously misrepresents the reality that
there were a variety of factors that led to the end of the dictatorships. Ultimately, when
considering the economic and political turmoil in addition to ongoing pressure caused by the
Junta’s most fervent opposition, the human rights movement, it becomes clear that the Malvinas
War was only a singular catalyst that demanded change, not the only, nor arguably the most
significant one.

Economic Instability
The Proceso, which was formerly known as The Act of National Reorganization, quite
literally proposed and executed an economic reorganization of the country. As described by
Pion-Berlin, “Newly designated Minister of Economics, Jose A. Martinez de Hoz, announced
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strict austerity measures...which launched the government on an unprecedented free market (or,
as commonly referred to in the Latin American setting, liberal) crusade to eliminate inflation and
unshackle the economy from ‘fetters’ of state control” (Pion-Berlin 1985, 57). Over the next two
years, the country struggled to adapt to this new model of economic strategy. With the creation of
policy that aimed to combat and lessen the fallout this new change was inevitably going to cause,
the effects still painfully weighed on Argentines, and as such, “virtually every socio-economic
sector of Argentine society, from laborers and small shop owners to large industrialists and
agriculturalists, opposed the economic policies” (Pion-Berlin 1985, 59). However, state leaders
were able to remain relatively unimpacted by this opposition due in large part to their united and
steadfast commitment to seeing this plan through. It was this breakdown of unity that contributed
to the larger downfall of the Junta. In March of 1980, four of the nation's largest financial
institutions went bankrupt creating considerable economic hardship for both individuals and
sectors alike (Pion-Berlin 1985). Of course, no individual minister or military branch wanted to
be blamed for this state-induced failure and, for the first time, comments were made that publicly
suggested “internalized displeasure” for the economic policies, thus suggesting a clear
correlation between the recent economic hardships the state faced and the imposed policies
(Pion-Berlin 1985, 61). The following months remained economically challenging, and when
compounded with other factors, these ongoing economic difficulties indicate that the end was not
abrupt and caused by one-factor. Rather, the end of the Dirty War had been developing for years
before their official demise and the reasoning for their downfall remained multifaceted.
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Rapid Political Change
The Junta had decided that the term of the Presidency would not exceed five years
(Dávila 2013). As such, President Videla was replaced by Roberto Viola in 1981. Viola, while
considered a moderate and unsurprising pick, was a clear and conscious choice by the Junta to
appoint someone to the position that would alter the economic state (Pion-Berlin 1985). While
still in agreement with the overarching goals of the Proceso, Viola was not as committed to the
liberal plan that had been put in place under Videla (Pion-Berlin 1985). During the transition of
power, both Videla and Viola ultimately prioritized a smooth transition of power over the
maintenance of the free market economic strategy; but, as Pion-Cerlin put it, “By discarding a
key component of the plan, it left itself with its mission” (Pion-Berlin 1985, 64).
Now left without a mission, and a lack of unity already clearly having begun to unravel
even before this transition, Viola’s government was doomed from the start. Internal disputes
among military groups and leaders revealed what Pion-Berlin called the “first organized
expression of solidarity among the major political parties since the coup,” with the formation of
the Multipartidaria, which was comprised of political leaders and posed a considerable threat to
the Junta due to their vocality and prominence (Pion-Berlin 1985, 65). A mere nine months after
his appointment to the Presidency, Viola was soon overwhelmed by the failing economy and
instability that had existed under Videla, and had only worsened in recent months, and was
ousted and replaced by Leopoldo Galtieri (Dávila 2013).
Ultimately, having decided to engage in the Malvinas War against Great Britain, and
experiencing an embarrassing loss. The aforementioned challenges proved too much thus
rendering the Junta no longer viable. Furthermore, the emergent human rights movement, which
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included the Madres of the Plaza de Mayo, and the drawing of the international community,
made it so that Argentina’s actions were closely watched. Thus, the pressures created by the
human rights activists, the loss of the war, considerable economic hardships, and political change
all led to the end of the dictatorship.

IV. Argentina’s Process of Transitional Justice and the Catalyst of Human Rights Activism
Argentina’s human rights trials in 1985 have been considered to be one of the most
notable landmarks in the history of human rights; Kathryn Sikkink refers to Argentina’s
transition as going, “from pariah state to global protagonist” (Sikkink 2011, 102). Following the
end of the dictatorship in 1983, the country’s newly civilian-led government began to embark on
a process of transitional justice. On this transition, former President Raul Alfonsín wrote:
In our society, the building of democracy could not be viewed simply as a process of
restoration; it was essentially a process of creating new institutions and implementing
new routines, new habits, and new ways for people to live together. It was a matter not of
reconstructing a system that was functioning well until it was interrupted by
authoritarianism, but of establishing new foundations for an authentic democratic system,
something that we had never fully achieved (Alfonsín 1993, 15).

Argentina began a process of transitional justice that attempted to heal the wound that had been
created while reaffirming and strengthening their commitment to democracy. Knowing that this
was a daunting process, yet committed to the search for truth and justice, Alfonsín acknowledged
that addressing this past was essential to achieving these goals, writing:

There was a tradition in Argentina that after each dictatorship, the crimes and abuses
committed by the authoritarian government would go unpunished. My administration,
moved by an urgent ethical imperative, for the first time opened the judicial channels so
that the extreme violations of human rights perpetrated by both revolutionary terrorism
and state terrorism could be investigated and judged by an independent judicial body.
Thus the impunity of the powerful would come to an end (Alfonsín 1993, 15).
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Alfonsín’s statement directly addresses the historical lack of accountability and justice after
atrocity and articulates the commitment to ending, what he calls, “the impunity of the powerful.”
This statement simultaneously highlights the importance of a judicial body in achieving this goal.
Sikkink writes that, “Argentine human rights activists were not passive recipients of a
justice cascade, but the pioneers and propagators of multiple new tactics and transitional justice
mechanisms'' (Sikkink 2011, 147). Scholars have frequently credited human rights activists and
organizations for their active roles during this period of transition. But, in addition to playing a
crucial role within the transition, they themselves transformed the process through the innovation
of new tactics and pushing the boundaries of current processes. In her book, Memory and
Transitional Justice in Argentina and Uruguay Against Impunity, Francesca Lessa analyzes what
she calls Argentina’s fragmented process of transitional justice by breaking it down into three
distinct phases (Lessa 2013). She cites initial actions taken during redemocratization between
1983 and 1985, which includes the Trial of the Juntas and the use of truth commissions through
the formation of CONADEP, as being the first phase in Argentina’s transitional justice process
(Lessa 2013). She calls this first phase “truth and limited justice” (Lessa 2013, 50). Lessa then
asserts that the second phase, which she calls “Impunity Laws and Pardons: Challenging
Oblivion,” occurred between 1986 and 2002 (Lessa 2013, 57). She argues that during this phase,
the country took steps away from a process of transitional justice and towards impunity. She also
notes the important role human rights activists and “civil society” played during this period,
writing that they “worked relentlessly to prevent the past from fading into oblivion” (Lessa 2013,
50). She goes on to say that, “Their efforts together with revelations of past horrors and
developments in national, regional, and international arenas generated the pressures for the
occurrence of the third critical juncture...and produced yet again a new shift, away from impunity
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and once more toward accountability” (Lessa 2013, 50). This shift, she argues, signals the start of
the third phase, “The Present Challenge of TJ: the Return of Prosecutions and Memory” (Lessa
2013, 50). She cites this phase as having started in 2003 and continuing until 2012, but debatably
to present day, and argues that it is here that Argentina returned to a process of accountability as
seen through the annulment of impunity laws and the return toward criminal prosecutions
through the judicial system (Lessa 2013).
This section expands upon both Sikkink’s description of the role of human rights activists
and Lessa’s aforementioned account of the fragmented nature of the transitional justice process
in Argentina. I will explain what new transitional mechanisms human rights activists created
during this period. I will then utilize this analysis to argue that human rights activists not only
helped to innovate new transitional justice mechanisms, but contributed themselves to the
process of transitional justice by holding perpetrators accountable. Rather than human rights
activists only making considerable impact in the second phase that resulted in the successes of
the third phase, the work of human rights activists pushed forward formal processes of
transitional justice as early as during the Dirty War.

Phase 1- Redemocratization and Alfonsín
The democratic elections of 1983 featured a vote between Raúl Alfonsín of the UCR
(Radical Civic Union) and Italo Lúder of The Argentine (Peronist) Justicialista Party (PJ)
(Levitsky 2003). The election resulted in a win for Alfonsín, “whose human rights-oriented
discourse appealed to many independent and middle-class voters, [and] easily defeated Luder,
handing the PJ its first-ever electoral defeat (Levitsky 2003, 12). On December 10th, 1983,
newly-elected President Raúl Alfonsín stated in his address to the nation that:
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A happy circumstance has it that this day, as Argentines begin this stage of 100 years of
liberty, peace and democracy, is the day of human rights. And, therefore, we want to
pledge ourselves once again: We will categorically and decisively work for the dignity of
man, to whom we know liberty and justice must be granted, because the defense of
human rights does not end with just the preservation of life, but also includes the fight
that we are absolutely determined to carry out against the misery and poverty of our
nation (Alfonsín, 1983)
Three days after his inauguration, Alfonsín demonstrated his commitment to this promise and
promulgated a decree that called upon Argentina’s highest court, the Consejo Supremo Militar,
“to try the members of the first three juntas for crimes against human rights such as illegal
deprivation of liberty, torture, and homicide” (Speck 1987, 500). In addition to attempting to
navigate judicial routes to achieve justice for Argentines, Alfonsín issued decree 187 which
established the Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (National Commission on
the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) (Speck 1987). Both actions put Argentina’s process
of dealing with their recent past into the global spotlight, ultimately making it so that even today
their approach has been considered exceptional and groundbreaking.

Truth Commission
The creation of the CONADEP was multipurpose. The official task of the commission
was to gather information regarding the disappearances that occurred in the country between
1976 and 1983 (Lessa 2013). The unofficial tasks of the commission, however, was to first help
construct a public narrative that factually articulated the events of the past. Additionally, the use
of a truth commission aimed to reaffirm the citizen’s trust in the state’s institutions. The
corruption that occurred during the Dirty War had extended to that of the judicial system and
resulted in a loss of faith in and respect for the judicial system's ability to address the past
effectively on its own (Crenzel 2008). Faced with a daunting task, both due to how widespread
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disappearances had been in the country and the unique characteristics of the dictatorship, the
commission worked for nine months to collect information (Lessa 2013). Over the course of this
time, the commission “interviewed 1,500 survivors, relatives, and former political prisoners
throughout Argentina; it also identified and inspected sites where clandestine detention centers
had operated, and visited mass burial sites, morgues, hospitals, and prisons” (Lessa 2013, 53).
The commission ultimately compiled their findings into the famous report Nunca Más. The truth
commission and subsequent production of the Nunca Más report proved impactful for two main
reasons. Firstly, the findings were utilized during both the trials in the mid-1980s as well as in
the early 2000’s when the ability to try additional people became available (Lessa 2013). This
thus proved the actions of the CONADEP to be essential in providing a wealth of evidence that
was able to be used by the judicial system. Secondly, the use of this information in judicial
proceeds affirms the important relationship between judicial and non-judicial transitional justice
mechanisms, Sikkink writing that it, “shows that truth commissions and prosecutions are not
necessarily two separate mechanisms but can be complementary and mutually reinforcing”
(Sikkink 2011, 123).

The Trial of the Junta
Alfonsín’s speech called on the judicial system to hold the top military commanders
responsible for their actions. In February of 1985, the Cámara Federal de Apelaciones en lo
Criminal (the Cámara), took jurisdiction of a case that was against nine top commanders for
crimes of human rights abuses during the Dirty War (Steck 1987). The trial was unprecedented
for the country, but also globally. No trial had ever taken place in Latin America holding leaders
of previous authoritarian regimes accountable for their abuses while in office (Sikkink 2011).
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This was to be the next major human rights trial after that of trials held in Greece and Portugal
during the 1970s (Sikkink 2011). Prosecutors forged a new path, Sikkink writing that, “Although
the Greek trial had been held almost a decade earlier, that model was not present in the minds of
the Argentines as they organized their own trial” (Sikkink 2011, 123).
Ultimately, five of the nine commanders were convicted, including arguably the two most
important leaders: Videla, former President of the first Junta, and Massera, former head of the
Navy (Sikkink). In addition to holding the perpetrators accountable for their actions through the
courts, the trials greatly impacted the public and the narrative surrounding the actions that
occurred during the dictatorship. On this, Sikkink writes that, “the trials were a national event, a
public spectacle that had the purpose of punishing the guilty, reaffirming certain norms, and
creating a national understanding of the past'' (Sikkink 2011, 128).

Human Rights Activists and IACHR
While various human rights organizations were formed during and after the dictatorship, a key
component became utilizing international human rights organizations (Sikkink 2011). By
leveraging the support of the international community, activists were able to strengthen their
demands for truth and justice (Sikkink 2011). The relationship held between human rights
activists in Argentina and the Inter-American Commision on Human Rights (IACHR) became
one of significant importance (Sikkink 2011). The IACHR’s work started during the
dictatorship.Representatives visited the country in 1979 to assess the situation and compile their
findings in a report (Lessa 2013). The IACHR’s report was the first physical document to call for
human rights prosecution and, while the government attempted to block its dispersal within
Argentina, human rights groups such as The Center for Legal Studies (CELS) helped to do so in
secret (Sikkink 2011). The recommendations made in the IACHR’s report proved essential in
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helping to unify and mobilize human rights activists in the country. While human rights
advocates had previously feared calling specifically for justice, favoring calls for truth, by 1983
they made direct calls for trials and punishment (Sikkink 2011). When the dictatorship finally
came to an end that same year, human rights activists actively participated in supporting
candidates for the new government in hopes of pushing forward their causes (Sikkink 2011).
Additionally, they organized in groups and performed marches during this period of transition,
Sikkink including this example:
On August 19, 1983, for instance, 40,000 people marched in the streets of Buenos Aires
to repudiate the military’s proposal for a self-amnesty law to protect itself from future
prosecution...On September 23, the military government signed the complete
self-amnesty law for everyone associated with the regime (Sikkink 2011, 119).
Once Alfonsín took office in December 1983, he took immediate steps towards justice, one of
which included repealing the self-amnesty law that was put in place by the Proceso (Sikkink
2011). This is only one example of how human rights activists laid the groundwork for real,
tangible change within the formal process of transitional justice that the country underwent. The
work human rights activists performed, which included reaching out to international
organizations, was influential from the beginning. Here, we begin to see how the successes that
are discussed later on this chapter were not due to a sudden burst of human rights activism, but
rather part of a larger movement that had taken form during the dictatorship and continued to
grow from there on.

Phase 2- The Push towards Impunity
Arguing that there was a turning point in which the human rights activism boomed, Lessa
writes, “But on the twentieth anniversary of the military coup in 1996, over 150,000 people
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participated in demonstrations in Plaza de Mayo when normally only a few thousand did;
“something that had been latent finally exploded” on that symbolic date” (Lessa 2013, 63). She
argues that it was not just the fact that this was a significant anniversary for the country, but also
that this was a response to the country’s shift away from justice and towards impunity. The
previous section has already illustrated how the ending of the dictatorship was not sudden and
that human rights activists had made a significant impact prior to this event. The rise in activism
and methods in the 1990s can be understood as a response to the judicial mechanisms that were
blocked with the passing of impunity laws and presidential pardons. As we will see, not only did
human rights activists help make possible the return to transitional justice beginning in the
1990s, during which impunity laws were annulled and judicial proceedings were again made
possible, but their approaches also proved that they could hold individuals accountable in
informal ways.

Impunity Laws
After the Trial of the Junta ended, the courts became flooded with cases involving
lower-level officers (Sikkink 2011). Former members of the military began to panic, as did
President Alfonsín. While Alfonsín had sought out justice, he had only intended for this justice
to go so far as to prosecute the nine high-level officers involved in the first trial (Sikkink 2011).
With this panic breeding considerable unrest, Alfonsín found himself pressured to pick between
prioritizing transitional justice or stable democracy (Sikkink 2011). The government decided to
initially halt the ability to pursue prosecutions (Lessa 2013). This was then cemented with the
full blockage of pursuing justice via the judicial system through the passing of the Ley de Punto
Final (Full Stop Law) and Ley de Obediencia Debida (Due Obedience Law) (Lessa 2013). The
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Full Stop Law was presented to the public by Alfonsín’s government as a “compromise to
deliver justice and allow society to put the past behind” (Lessa 2013, 57). With over 6,000 cases
having been filed by December 1986, the government wanted to “secure what had been achieved
so far or risk jeopardizing everything if we carried on,” as legal advisor Malamud Goti put it
(Lessa 2013, 57). In an attempt to stop the influx of cases, the law established a 60-day period
for alleging cases of human rights abuses (Lessa 2013). By the February 22nd, 1987 deadline,
nearly 500 new cases had been filed; the law had failed to halt the filing of prosecutions like the
government had hoped (Lessa 2013). Since the government’s move with the Full Stop Law had
been largely unsuccessful, and more unrest had ensued, Alfonsín responded with the enactment
of the Due Obedience Law (Lessa 2013). This law essentially established amnesty for those
accused and blocked the ability for trials in the future (Sikkink 2011). A state of impunity
returned.

Menem’s Pardons
While Alfonsín had tried to confront the past and hold perpetrators accountable for their
actions through legal justice with his initial actions, President Carlos Menem aimed to address
this past and move forward in a different manner (Lessa 2013). After his election in 1989,
Menem offered to the public the way in which they would achieve this: through pardons
(Sikkink 2011). While 68% of Argentine’s opposed the first set of pardons, in which nearly 300
military personnel involved in human rights abuses benefitted, Menem went ahead and issued a
second set of pardons of which 80% of the public disapproved (Lessa 2013). This second set of
pardons included those already convicted, most notably being that of Videla, Massara, and Viola
(Lessa 2013). Ultimately, the pardons issued by Menem only furthered the country in the
direction of impunity and forced human rights activists to innovate.
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Truth Trials:
While the Punto Final and Obediencia laws, coupled with an onslaught of presidential
pardons by Menem, blocked criminal prosecutions, human rights activists attempted to innovate
in the legal realm through the creation of “truth trials” (Lessa 2013). The Center for Legal
Studies (CELS), a human rights organization founded in 1979, headed this process, arguing that
while criminal prosecutions were not attainable, victims had the right to know what happened to
their loved ones. As explained by the then-director of CELS Martín Abregú wrote:
The impossibility of pursuing the authors of these crimes in criminal proceedings did not
mean simply the closure of any kind of judicial intervention. On the contrary, the social
impact caused by the declarations of the former naval officer (Scilingo) highlighted
another crucial issue about state terrorism: the right of the relatives to know the final
destiny of their loved ones and the right of society to know in detail the methodology
used by the military dictatorship to exterminate tens of thousands of Argentines. It was
this need to know (in both its aspects, the personal right of the relatives and the collective
right of the whole community) that was presented to the courts, pleading the "Right to the
Truth” (HRW 2001).
CELS aimed to present compelling cases to the court that would cause them to legally uphold the
right to truth. Drawing support from international human rights bodies, such as the IACHR and
the Inter-American Court who both had worked to establish this right, the argument found some
success (HRW 2001). The result of the two cases first brought forth were reflective of the
success of truth trials in general. The Federal Chamber of Buenos Aires ruled that in the case of
Mónica Candelaria Mignone, the daughter of Emilio Mignone. who founded CELS, “demanded
that the relatives had a right to know the truth about the fate of their loved ones and the court had
a duty to use its powers to assist them” due to domestic and international law (HRW 2001).
Additionally, the success of Mignone’s case resulted in future successes for other families who
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sought out information through truth trials. The case of Alejandra Lapaco, however, went
through a lengthy legal process that ultimately ended up in the Supreme Court (HRW 2001).
After the case was held up in the Supreme Court for three years, the result was a 5-4 ruling that
found that, “it would be pointless to allow the inquiry to be reopened, since the legal basis for a
prosecution no longer existed” (HRW 2001). The truth trials proved significant for two main
reasons. Firstly, they provided valuable information that was later used when criminal
prosecutions became possible in 2006 (Lessa 2013). Secondly, they represented a legal
innovation in which human rights activists and victims remained able to demand justice despite
the impunity laws in place. On this, Leonardo Filippini acknowledges that, “The “truth trials”
contributed to revealing the facts and allotting accountability; in addition, they set the foundation
for future developments and ultimately served as a compromise between the commitment to
finding the truth and the context of impunity” (Filippini 2011, 14). Thus, the truth trials provided
accountability even when commonly accepted means of transitional justice was seemingly
blocked through the formation of a new transitional justice mechanism that remained within
formalized, state-sponsored institutions. The utilization of this information during later criminal
prosecutions helps us to see how the work of human rights activists within the state both
innovated new mechanisms within the formal transitional justice framework and bolstered future
steps towards justice.
Foreign Trials
While faced with impunity within Argentina, human rights activists turned to
international forces to attempt to hold perpetrators accountable. Italy was the first country to
proceed with trials, some as early as 1983, but notable cases include the prosectution “of
ex-generals Carlos Guillermo Suárez Mason and Santiago Riveros to life imprisonment, and five
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navy codefendants to 24 years in prison, all in absentia, on charges of kidnapping, torture, and
pre-meditated murder of seven Italian citizens and the kidnapping of a child” (CELS 2001). But,
other European countries, such as Spain, also held trials and convicted human rights abusers
from the Argentina military (Lessa 2013). The use of foreign trials highlighted a major
discrepancy between state and international justice; trials in Europe showed that prosecuting
individuals through formal judicial proceedings was achievable, thus fueling debate on
accountability and the application of this method in Argentine courts (Lessa 2013).

Confronting Amnesty Laws
In 2000, CELS again proved their ability to innovate in the face of obstruction, this time
attempting to directly confront amnesty laws and prove their unconstitutionality (Lessa 2013).
The Simón case, also known as the Poblete case, called upon courts to open an investigation into
the torture and forced disapearance of José Poblete and Getrudis Hlaczik who had disappeared in
November 1978 and whose daughter, Claudia, had been illegally appropriated (Sikkink 2011).
The case named Julio Simón, a member of the Argentine Federal Police, as the perpetrator of
these abuses (Sikkink 2011). This case pointed out a fundamental flaw: the laws in place would
allow the courts to find Simón criminally responsible for the kidnapping and falsification of
Claudia’s identity, but not for the original and serious crimes of the murder and disappearance of
her parents, which ultimately led to Claudia’s kidnapping (Lessa 2013). Prosecutors also argued
that maintaining the amnesty laws went against international and regional human rights treaties
that Argentina was obligated to adhere to (Sikkink 2011). Ultimately, Federal Judge Gabriel
Cavallo ruled for the first time the amnesty laws to be unconstitutional and breaching
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international obligations that state was required to meet in March 2001 (Lessa 2013). This ruling
later proved significant when in July of 2005 the Supreme Court confirmed the decision in the
“Simón” case and repealed the amnesty laws (Filippini 15, ).
Escraches: An Example of Innovation by Human Rights Activists
“Si no hay justicia hay escrache” (Grupo De Arte Callejero: Thought, Practices, and
Actions 2019, 39). Translated to English, we can understand this famous slogan to mean “If there
is not justice, there is escrache.” Escraches emerged in the 1990s as a form of collective, direct
action taken by human rights activists in Argentina when faced with the rise of impunity in the
country, specifically seen through the passage of the laws Obediencia Debida and Punto Final, as
well as the issuing of presidential pardons (Grupo De Arte Callejero: Thought, Practices, and
Actions 2019). The first escraches were constructed by H.I.J.O.S., an acronym for the
organization Hijos por la Identidad y la Justicia contra el Olvido y el Silencio, in 1995 (Grupo
De Arte Callejero: Thought, Practices, and Actions 2019). The group emerged “out of the need
to denounce the impunity of institutional justice” (Grupo De Arte Callejero: Thought, Practices,
and Actions 2019, 39). The technique was later adopted by various other human rights activists
and organizations, including Grupo de Arte Callejeros (GAC), an organization in Argentina that
emerged in the 1990s and utilizes art as a form of activism in response to mass atrocity (Grupo
De Arte Callejero: Thought, Practices, and Actions 2019). As described by GAC, “The idea was
for people to repudiate the genocidists still on the loose, to create “social condemnation,” to
question the absence of a legal punishment” (Grupo De Arte Callejero: Thought, Practices, and
Actions 2019, 2). Escraches can take various forms, including constructing roads signs, spray
painting the ground, or hanging posters, all of which essentially mark a location of where a
genocidaire, for example, may live.
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Escrache is an Argentine lunfardo word that can be translated to mean “to bring into the
light something hidden” or “to reveal what power hides” (Grupo De Arte Callejero: Thought,
Practices, and Actions 2019). GAC insightfully notes that this word holds significant meaning
when considering the human rights abusers who lived comfortably and anonymously prior to the
use of escraches throughout the country (Grupo De Arte Callejero: Thought, Practices, and
Actions 2019, 2). The rise of escraches initially worked as an intervention in public spaces that
drew attention to the homes of genocidists and spaces of significance during El Proceso, such as
detention centers (Grupo De Arte Callejero: Thought, Practices, and Actions 2019). Ultimately,
as described by GAC, “The idea was for people to repudiate the genocidists still on the loose, to
create “social condemnation,” to question the absence of a legal punishment” (Grupo De Arte
Callejero: Thought, Practices, and Actions 2019, 2).
As a technique that broke with traditional politics, the escraches proved able to affect
political and social change (Grupo De Arte Callejero: Thought, Practices, and Actions 2019).
This was made clear when Jorge Luis Magnacco, a doctor who was head of Obstetrics at a
hospital in Argentina, was fired due to his previous involvement in kidnappings during El
Processo. This firing occurred after an escrache was performed in Magnacco’s neighborhood,
thus proving the impact of the escraches and subsequent social condemnation that ultimately
brought about a certain type of justice and accountability (Grupo De Arte Callejero: Thought,
Practices, and Actions 2019). In addition to escraching those who were directly involved in the
dictatorship, 2003 marked a transition to expanding the use of escraches to those who were
“complicit” during the dictatorship and remained unaffected after. GAC cites the example of
Héctor Vidal who kidnapped babies born in detention centers and created false birth certificates
for them. Vidal went unpunished due to the Punto Final and Obediencia Debida laws, and just as

Sinatra 58
the slogan goes, without justice came his escraching (Grupo De Arte Callejero: Thought,
Practices, and Actions 2019).
Escraching helps us to reflect on the use of this mechanism as a form of justice. As
described by GAC, “There was a strong sense that the escrache was a form of justice that broke
with the representations of institutional justice: a justice constructed by people in the day to day
via the repudiation of the genocidist in the neighborhood, the reappropriation of politics, and the
reflection of the subject matter of the present'' (Grupo De Arte Callejero: Thought, Practices,
and Actions 2019, 40). In this sense, escraching was a way of reclaiming justice by moving away
from institutional judicial practices and towards political actions that created, “a spectacle
represented in the practice of justice” (Grupo De Arte Callejero: Thought, Practices, and Actions
2019, 41). Through this process, escraches resulted in social condemnation, thus realizing justice
through subsequent punishment outside of existing institutional mechanisms and processes.
An investigation into the use of escraches also reveals another important development.
While this period allowed for considerable innovation by human rights activists in their approach
to demanding and creating justice, it also allowed for the construction of a social movement.
GAC writes about their involvement in the Marcha de Resistencia, a march that occurs every
December in the Plaza de Mayo and is organized by the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo (Grupo De
Arte Callejero: Thought, Practices, and Actions 2019). The use of escrache in this march
allowed for various human rights activists, including GAC, H.I.J.O.S., and the Madres de la
Plaza de Mayo, to come together in solidarity and combine their efforts so as to effect change.
The intervention that was designed by HIJOS and GAC for the march, and which was first
utilized in 1999, was called Juicio y Castigo, or Justice and Punishment (Grupo De Arte
Callejero: Thought, Practices, and Actions 2019). As described by GAC, the purpose of this
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intervention had the “dual focus on demanding institutional justice without losing sight of the
importance of constructing a social condemnation (Grupo De Arte Callejero: Thought, Practices,
and Actions 2019, 82). Juicio y Castigo became the slogan of a new generation of activists and
was reproduced on posters, pins, and signs, demonstrating how critical visual interventions can
be in mobilizing a social movement and demanding action (Grupo De Arte Callejero: Thought,
Practices, and Actions 2019). Through examples like the escraches, we begin to see the
emergence of informal ways human rights activists sought out accountability, achieved it, created
a social movement, and helped raise awareness of the issues in the present and their relation to
the past.

Phase 3
Lessa argues that the country entered the third phase, which she calls “The Present
Challenge of TJ: The Return of Prosecutions and Memory” once the impunity laws were
annulled (Lessa 2013). While she credits the fervor of the activists during the 90s paired with the
election of Kirchner as having sparked this transition, of which I have demonstrated was not born
out of this one decade, but rather began with human rights activists during the dictatorship, we
see the country enter a “full-scale return” to justice beginning in 2003 and continuing to the
present. In 2004, judges rejected Menem’s pardons (Lessa 2013). In June 2005, the Supreme
Court upheld the decision of the Poblete case that CELS had initiated and declared the impunity
laws to be unconstitutional (Lessa 2013). And, in 2006, the country reopened the possibility of
prosecuting former human rights abusers (Lessa 2013). As Lessa writes, “As of December 2012,
nearly 1,926 individuals were implicated in crimes against humanity, 799 have been prosecuted,
262 condemned, 20 have been acquitted, while 306 have passed away” (Lessa 2013, 73).
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Human Rights Activism Continues
Even after justice became possible again through formal mechanisms of transitional
justice via the judicial system, human rights activists continued to have an active role in the
community. Many of the aforementioned organizations continue to do work today. The Madres
de la Plaza de Mayo continue to march every Thursday at 3:30, they also continue to search for
the desaparecidos and verify their identities through exhumations and DNA matching (Goñi
2017). The escraches movement also continues to this day in which they continue to attempt to
achieve justice and hold others accountable both inside and outside of formal institutions.

Conclusion
The case of Argentina highlights a variety of important points. Firstly, we are faced with a
particularly brutal account of abuse that was so widespread and so systematic that it impacted
nearly every facet of Argentine society. Secondly, we come to the understanding that despite the
brutal repression, there remained enough space for a human rights movement to begin to grow in
the country, such as the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, and which ultimately created substantial
pressure for the Junta regime. With these begin to unpack their process of transitional justice in
which human right activists can be seen pushing forward formal processes of transitional justice
as well as engaging in their own forms of informal transitional justice. Ultimately, the case of
Argentina helps us to see the power of a combination of techniques and that even after a period
of impunity, transitional justice can be returned to, largely thanks to the role of human rights
activists.
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Chapter 3
On April 26, 1937, the small Basque town of Guernica was attacked. While the citizens
were defenseless, German warplanes unleashed aerial bombings on the people at the
authorization of General Francisco Franco (Zelazko 2021). The town was almost completely
destroyed by this attack. Only mere months after this attack, Pablo Picasso revealed his painting,
Guernica, representing the horrors of this attack, in Paris. The production of the painting was a
result of the Spanish government who commissioned Picasso to create the painting in hopes of
raising international awareness and garnering support against the atrocity occurring in the
country. The attack in Guernica, however, was not a singular event but rather representative of an
ongoing struggle in the country. Amid a Civil War, Spain was only just entering a period of
abuse and repression at the hands of Franco. Today, Picasso’s painting stands as a symbol of
protest against abuses of state power and horror inflicted upon innocent civilians (Kopper 2014).
While this symbology has grown, and Guernica has been harnessed as a powerful activist and
political tool, its meaning “refers less and less to atrocities of the Spanish Civil War” and instead
serves as a universal symbol of the horrors of war (Kopper 2014, 444). The distancing
relationship between Guernica and the events of the Civil War, as well as that of the atrocities
that subsequently followed the war as the country entered a 36-year dictatorship, are
synonymous with a deeper struggle- that is Spain’s lack of a formal process of transitional justice
in favor of silence and oblivion. While the Spanish people endured nearly 40 years’ worth of
abuses by Franco’s regime, beginning with the Civil War and continuing up until Franco’s death
and the end of his dictatorship, the 40 years that have since followed seem to have made little
attempt to deal with this past. Therefore, this chapter aims to understand what occurred during
the dictatorship as well as analyze how the country attempted to deal with this past. Through this
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examination, I will ultimately question what has prevented Spain from engaging with a formal
process of transitional justice like we have seen in the example of Argentina.
In order to do this, I will turn to José Gonzalez’s conception of the periods following the
end of the Spanish Civil War. He argues that immediately following the end of the war, the
country underwent three distinct periods. This first of these was what he called a “Time of
Silence,” drawing upon the title of Luis Martín Santo’s book Tiempo de Silencio (Gonzalez
2009). I will analyze this period, which occurred during Franco’s dictatorship, by looking at the
specific human rights abuses that occurred and comparing them to those that were present in
Argentina during the Dirty War. I will also look at this period in relation to the presence, or lack
thereof, of human rights activists and their influence on the country. Gonzaléz then points to the
end of Franco’s regime as the “Time of Forgetfulness” in which the country chose to not examine
the past events with the intent of ensuring a smooth transition to democracy. I will compare
Spain’s transition to that of Argentina’s by looking at how they chose to transition from
dictatorship to democracy. Following this, Gonzaléz argues that the country did not begin to
examine this past until the 1990s in which the country finally entered a “Time of Memory.”
Unlike the previous two periods, this era began to engage in both informal and formal processes
of dealing with the country’s past. Building off of Gonzaléz’s framework, I will illustrate why
this period gave way to a rise in conversations and actions regarding Spain’s past and how
human rights activists have worked to push forward a process of transitional justice in a similar
manner to that of Argentina in hopes of entering a fourth period, which I refer to as the Time of
Action.
To accomplish this, I will begin first with an account of what specific human rights
abuses occurred during the Civil War and dictatorship. I will argue that the Civil War annihilated

Sinatra 63
the opposition, thus eliminating the threat of resistance. Turning to the “Time of Silence” I will
demonstrate that this was a forced silence, not a voluntary one, in which the dictatorship did not
allow for any activism due to the mechanisms of repression they utilized as well as the use of the
judicial system to legitimize their actions. Unlike the case of Argentina in which the repression
was extreme but not so extreme as to eliminate the possibility of activism, Franco’s regime left
no ability to mobilize and demand the protection of their human rights. I will then analyze the
“Time of Forgetfulness” by looking at both formal and informal actions taken by the government
and the Spanish people following the end of the dictatorship. In order to understand what may
have led to the different approaches the two countries had with handling this past, I will proceed
by analyzing the different modes of transition that two countries experienced. Spain’s transition
has been characterized as being “pacted,” referring to the weakened regime’s ability to negotiate
the process of transition with the incoming democratic state leaders. Argentina, on the other
hand, experienced a transition that has been categorized as “collapsed,” meaning that the
outgoing regime had no opportunity to maintain control nor negotiate the conditions of the
transition. I will illustrate how Spain’s pacted mode of transition aided them in preserving certain
aspects of the old regime and negotiation between both parties, ultimately resulting in the
widespread use of amnesties in Spain that was absent in Argentina immediately following the
dictatorship. This will then lead me to a discussion regarding the “Time of Memory” in which
the country began to question the events of the past and started to create an informal process of
transitional justice. This will lead me to a critical analysis of the actions taken by human rights
activists and groups during this period, which I will argue, is ongoing. I will conclude my
chapter by arguing that Spain is appearing to be headed towards the fourth period of
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accountability, in a similar sense to Argentina, thanks to the ongoing efforts of the human rights
activist.

Part I. The Civil War
The case of Spain remains unique in that the period of violence began prior to Franco’s
official rise to power. Here, we see the first key difference between Argentina and Spain’s cases
emerge. Unlike Argentina, which endured 50 years of alternating between civilian and military
rule, Spain’s wound was first born out of war (Lavedra 2012). Spain erupted in war in the
summer of 1936. The emergent rightists, “moved to act by fear of the future, the desire to
compensate for past fears, and also by very deep religious sentiment,” ultimately coalesced in an
attempt to attack the existing government (Alba 1978, 120). This right, known as the
Nationalists, Falangists, or later Francoists, fought against those defending the Republic, referred
to as the Republicans. On July 17th, 1936, General Franco, who led the Nationalists, proclaimed
to the Spanish people that the army, “had decided to reestablish order and appealed to the
Republican sentiment of all Spaniards to be ready to participate in the task of restoring Spain”
(Alba 1978, 117). What was supposed to be an easy and successful military coup quickly turned
into a full-blown war. The war proved bloody from the start. While the Republican government
tried to squash the rebellious efforts, it was ultimately the people that turned what was expected
to be a swift victory for the Nationalists into a full-fledged war that lasted for the following three
years. The war came to an end in 1939 with Nationalists winning control of the country (Alba
1978).
What makes this transition to dictatorship particularly noteworthy and significantly
different from that of Argentina’s transition to the Dirty War dictatorship, was the complete and
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total destruction of the opposition. Those who opposed Franco ended up in one of three
situations: death, exile, or imprisonment. Alba writes that following the end of the Civil War and
during the very beginning of his dictatorship, Franco “found a country (or rather, that part of the
country which has constituted the Republican zone) deprived of technicians, specialized workers,
and intellectuals. Most of these had gone into exile. Had they not, they would have found
themselves in jail within days after the end of the war, since they had formed the framework of
the Republican army and the economy (Alba 1978, 172). Those who actively fought against
Franco had no choice but to flee or be killed or imprisoned. Thus, those who may have remained
loyal to the Republic had no choice but to hide these feelings or else face a similar fate. The
complete destruction of the opposition paired with an ongoing repression of Republican ideology
and action played a significant role in ensuring the longevity of Franco’s rule and allowed for an
onslaught of abuse at the hands of the state. In understanding this complete destruction, we begin
to see why a transition similar to that of Argentina once the dictatorship came to end proved
considerably difficult to achieve.

Part II. Franco’s Dictatorship and the Time of Silence
The decision to construct a transition that focused on forgetting the past left no room for
formal investigations. This “Time of Silence” causes us to question how this silencing may have
contributed to a transition that focused on forgetting and thus eliminating the possibility to
engage in a formal process of transitional justice. In order to understand why Spain chose this
approach as opposed to Argentina, who did go through a formal process of transitional justice, I
assert that rather than the “silence” that occurred during the dictatorship being a choice, it was an
action demanded by Franco and his regime. Ultimately, the repression of Franco’s dictatorship
was so extreme as to eliminate any and all possibilities for activism and resistance, thus requiring
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societal obedience towards “silence”. In order to illustrate this, I will examine Spain's
dictatorship, paying particular attention to the similarities and differences between its
dictatorship and Argentina’s.

Franco’s Human Rights Violations at a Glance
Even today questions remain regarding the crimes committed during Franco’s
dictatorship (Escuerdo 2014). The lack of state-sponsored investigations into the abuses that
occurred during the dictatorship have left gaps in our knowledge. However, independent research
done by scholars and historians has provided us with a good understanding of the events. It has
been estimated that during the dictatorship: “more than 130,000 people disappeared and died in
extrajudicial executions; 700,000 people were held in concentration camps from 1936 to 1942;
400,000 people were imprisoned for political reasons, many of whom were subjected to torture
or other cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment; 500,000 people were exiled for their political
beliefs” (Escuerdo 2014). Franco’s dictatorship, similar to that of the regime in power during
Argentina’s Dirty War, “tried to silence all sectors of society that were deemed to be subversive”
(Corbalán 2019, 218). To ensure this, the Spanish state utilized institutional violence, including
executing, torturing, kidnapping, and imprisoning those that went against the state and were
associated with the Republic (Corbalán 2019). The use of illegal detention, in which the state
created detention, labor, and prison camps for detainees, also remains an example of systematic
abuse and a severe violation of human rights similar to what was seen in the case of Argentina
(Gil 2014).
The mechanisms of violence and repression harnessed by the Spanish state are similar to
those employed by Argentina’s Junta during the Dirty War, but there is one clear difference

Sinatra 67
between the cases that emerges. The violence of Argentina’s dictatorship was in no means
milder. However, as referenced in the previous chapter, “The Argentine case was unique in that
the repression was extreme, but not so extreme as to eliminate all possibilities for activism”
Sikkink 2011, 137). In Argentina, activists created and maintained space that allowed for the rise
of the human rights movement during and following the dictatorship that was largely absent in
Spain. Instead, the brutality and repression associated with Franco’s dictatorship left no ability
for human rights to be demanded. The repression was all-encompassing and the mobilization of
activists was extremely limited. As such, calls for human rights were absent as any attempt to do
so would have been met with violence and repression.
When looking at the sharp contrast in how the two countries handled their transitions to
democracy, understanding the events that occurred during Spain’s dictatorship is essential. The
following will analyze some of the major human rights abuses that occurred during the Spanish
Civil War and the subsequent dictatorship, all at the hands of Franco. In particular, I will focus
on the execution and treatment of those killed during the Civil War, the corruption of the judicial
system during the dictatorship, and the child trafficking that occurred. While we have access to
this information thanks to the work of scholars, researchers, victims, and activists, Escuerdo
makes the important acknowledgment that, “Ascertaining the real measure of this
crime—gathering statistics and identifying persons and institutions involved—would require an
official investigation that the Spanish government still rejects” (Escuerdo 2014, 128). Without
this formal investigation, we remain solely in possession of information that does not fully
capture the atrocity that occurred nor the full scope of these events.
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Child Trafficking
More recently, investigations have revealed that a child trafficking network operated
under the Francoist regime (Escuerdo 2014). A government decree that was issued in 1940 made
it so that incarcerated mothers lost legal privileges of their children once the child turned three
(Escuerdo 2014). In some cases, children were taken prematurely if the mother gave birth while
incarcerated, in which the mothers were told that their child was stillborn when in reality they
were just taken from them (Escuerdo 2014). As a result of this decree, “about 30,000 children
became wards of a public organization called Auxilio Social or of various Catholic institutions''
(Escuerdo 2014, 128). Today, the number of children who were falsely declared stillborn remains
an unknown number (Escuerdo 2014). These kidnapped children ultimately ended up in one of
two different situations. They were either given to a family that was loyal to the regime or they
were “sold” via adoption, the government realizing that “the sale of young children was highly
profitable” (Escuerdo 2014, 128).
The abduction and trafficking of children in Spain is reminiscent of what occurred in
Argentina during the Dirty War. As Ana Corbalán notes, “During both dictatorships, thousands
of children were torn from their biological families, based on the rationale that their parents were
considered morally dangerous and that the state needed to avoid the degeneration of the race”
(Corbalán 2019). This systematic abduction of children during these dictatorships highlights both
the ideological and tactical strategies of the regimes. Both regimes validated their actions by
demoralizing and dehumanizing those they deemed “subversive.” This led to a legitimation of
their actions in which they viewed them as ultimately being for the greater good. Furthermore,
the coordination of the governments’ efforts to enact this system of child trafficking included
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people in positions of authority, such as “government agents, doctors, and nurses, most of whom
were nuns” (Escuerdo 2014, 128).
The events surrounding the child trafficking system reveal two important characteristics.
Firstly, we see how wide-reaching the mechanisms of abuse were. It is easy to compare these
events to that of Argentina who also faced a significant crisis regarding child abductions. But,
different from that of Argentina, the second important conclusion emerges, that is that this
information went unknown for a significant amount of time. In contrast, Argentina’s abductions
of children were extremely well known, especially once organizations such as the Madres de la
Plaza de Mayo and Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo emerged and highlighted this issue. The
Spanish public, on the other hand, was largely unaware of this abuse until decades after its
occurrence. This speaks to the incredible coordination of authority figures who ensured the
systematic and clandestine process of child trafficking. This was, of course, only further
protected by the lack of investigations and general attempt to forget the past that immediately
followed the end of the dictatorship. Ultimately, this systematic abduction of children during
Franco’s regime, which was largely unknown until the 1990s and early 2000s, helps us to
compare it to that of Argentina and begin to understand why Spain did not engage in a formal
process of transitional justice immediately following the end of their dictatorship.

Corruption of Judicial System
As Alicia Gil Gil wrote, “The Francoist dictatorship eliminated public rights and liberties
and exerted harsh repression of all political and ideological dissent” (Gil 2012, 105). Franco’s
regime ensured that the judiciary system was also under their control. As such, Franco
weaponized the judicial system as a mechanism that legitimized the human rights abuses

Sinatra 70
committed resulting in multiple violations of due process and law (Escuerdo 2014). This can be
seen through the creation of The Political Responsibilities Court which was responsible for
hearing over 229,000 cases during the dictatorship (Escuerdo 2014). Many of these cases
resulted in economic confiscation, but punishment could be as severe as jail or even death
(Escuerdo 2014). Nonetheless, the dictatorship made the confiscation of personal property legal
through court action; a process Escuerdo notes remains unaddressed today and unquantifiable
due to a lack of record and how widespread this abuse was (Escuerdo 2014).
In addition to evoking terror in the people through violence, the Franco regime differed
from that of Argentine dictatorship through the incredibly strict and repressive set of rules that
were legally codified (Gil 2012). The regime banned all “political parties and labour unions as
well as repressing all manifestations of political, religious and moral dissent” (Gil 2012).
It is important to note that the corruption of the judicial system began during the Civil
War (Richards 1998). Michael Richards writes in his book A Time of Silence: Civil War and the
Culture of Repression in Franco’s Spain, 1936-1945 that, “With no apparent sense of irony, the
long series of dictatorial edicts issued by the Franco regime was initiated by a law against
‘military rebellion’, proclaimed just ten days after the illegal rebellion of July 1936 which, itself,
was the first act of embryonic Francoist state” (Richards 1998, 78). Franco’s military maintained
control of the judicial system by creating legislation that enabled further abuse. The law against
‘military rebellion’ made it so that the upholding of laws related to the previous Republic was
illegal (Richards 1998, 78). Instead, this law “effectively became the hallmark of a regime which
saw itself permanently at war with society and gave a semblance of legality to the thousands of
summary executions carried out as the Francoist state was made” (Richards 1998, 78).
Additionally, the arresting of citizens for political reasons was disguised in an attempt to
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cover-up the fact that the state was taking political prisoners (Richards 1998). This resulted in
even harsher treatment as they were instead labeled “common prisoners” (Richards 1998).
Richards includes the account of a woman who stated that:
What the directors of Franco’s prisons wanted to show was that there were no political
prisoners, and we had to take a great deal of punishment for insisting this wasn’t so.
When a visitor came along and declared “There are no political prisoners here” we would
take a step forward and respond that “Yes, we are political prisoners (Richards 1998,
78).
This exclamation had consequences, with the result being a limitation of even the most
basic rights: food and communication (Richards 1998).
Additionally, while many were tried unfairly, the lack of trial also speaks to the
corruption of the system and the regime. Richards includes the account of José María Varela
Rendueles who was the Republican Civil Governor of Seville in 1936 and noted that even found
carrying “a membership card of the socialist union, the UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores)”
could result in immediate execution (Richards 1998, 39). Varela Rendueles went on to estimate
that “between July 1936 and February 1937 more than 6,000 were killed in the city of Seville
without appearing before a court whatsoever” (Richards 1998, 39). This account illustrates that
in addition to the judicial system being corrupt, this corruption extended to the lack of judicial
processes and the legitimization of executions.
The corruption of the judicial system legitimized abuses that included death,
imprisonment, the seizing of personal property, and more. But, perhaps most significant, the
edicts by Franco ensured that any and all attempts to organize against the new dictatorship were
impossible. The systematic killing and imprisonment of all opponents ensured that activists
could not mobilize and that human rights could not be demanded. As such, we begin to see that
unlike Argentina, in which the repression was not so extreme as to prevent the presence of
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activism, Franco’s Spain managed to repress any and all attempts for widespread activism within
the state. Ultimately, the systematic repression that eliminated opponents and prevented the
ability to mobilize activists resulted in a transition that could not organize in the same way
Argentina was able to immediately following the end of their respective dictatorships.

Art Calls out Injustices
In 1937, Picasso remarked, “I have always believed and still believe that artists who live
and work with spiritual values cannot and should not remain indifferent to a conflict in which the
highest values of humanity and civilisation are at stake” (Macdonald 2017). Horrified by the
events that were occurring in his home country of Spain, Picasso painted Guernica. Through this
painting, Picasso reflected on the horrors of pain and death associated with the rise of Facism in
the country (Macdonald 2017). As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, today Guernica is
associated with a more general fight against Facism and abuse at the hands of the government
versus that of the specific brutality associated with the Spanish Civil War and subsequent
dictatorship. Nonetheless, Guernica drew important attention to the events that were occurring in
Spain when it was produced. In addition, Picasso’s work was ultimately representative of a larger
international artistic response to the ongoing events in the country, all of which can be described
as a form of political activism.
The work of Juan Miró also demonstrates how artists engaged in a form of political
activism during this period. Miró, also a native Spaniard, reflected on the horror of the events
occurring in his home country and created his first work that took an active political stance
(Macdonald 2017). The creation of his piece Help Spain (Aidez L'Espagne) in 1937 was
originally “designed as a stamp to aid the Republican government” (Macdonald 2017). He then
sold the print in poster form, utilizing the funds to directly support the Republicans (Glueck
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1998). The print, which featured “a Catalán peasant raising a thick, defiant fist” demonstrated the
direct anti-Franco propaganda that writers and artists alike disseminated during this time (Glueck
1998). Miró went on to engage with politics through his work all the way through the 1970s
(Macdonald 2017).
As Jordi Mayoral stated, “The works created by these artists are still .. “part of the
Spanish collective memory; they represented a major turning point in the Civil War and the
country’s struggle between democracy and fascism” (Macdonald 2017). The work of artists like
Picasso and Miró proved important drawing international attention to this issue, both artists
displaying their work in Paris, but it is important to understand the limitations of activism during
this period that both artists illustrate. Picasso and Miró were only able to directly call out the
injustices through their art because they existed outside of the state. The severe brutality and
repression associated with the “time of silence” left no option for activism for those living within
Spain.
An analysis of the “Time of Silence” allows us to understand how a combination of
violence, abuse, and judicial measures helped ensure a complete and total repression of
Spaniards. This silence was not an option but rather a requirement for staying alive. As such, the
brutality of the dictatorship left absolutely no ability for human rights to be demanded or for
activists to mobilize. While activists, such as Picasso and Miró, were able to draw attention to
this issue, they were only able to do so as activists seeking refuge abroad, and their work, while
important, was ultimately unable to mobilize activism within the state and push forward a formal
process immediately following the end of the dictatorship like what was done in Argentina.
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Part III. Time of Forgetfulness

In 1975, Franco’s death offered the country the possibility of confronting their past.
However, deciding to prioritize the stable construction of a democratic future, political forces
sidelined this opportunity in favor of “consensus” (González 2009). Thus, the “pact of silence”
was adopted by the political left and right to ensure a united commitment to the 1978
Constitution (González 2009). Argued to have been the way Spaniards could achieve
“reconciliation,” this unwritten pact essentially advocated for forgetting the past in favor of the
construction of a new democracy and a new future (Escuerdo 2014, 132). Escuerdo notes that the
pact was multipurpose. It served to ensure silence from supporters and opponents alike; it forced
all to reject the past, which included Franco’s dictatorship and the Spanish Republic, and it
provided amnesty for the perpetrators of abuse (Escuerdo 2014). As Theresa Godwin Phelps
writes, “To agree not to discuss the past was a mark of good citizenship in Spain as it allowed
room for a fragile (and false) harmony that enabled Spain to act as if it were a unified country
and to, it was believed, thrive” (Phelps 2014, 836). The submission to this pact was socially
enforced and silently agreed upon. It forced Spain into a state of silence instead of justice,
oblivion instead of truth (Phelps 2014).
The act of forgetting that was forced upon Spain was celebrated for decades. Gil notes
that the Spanish transition was “always referred to as an example of peaceful transition par
excellence” (Gil 2014). While this period can be generally considered to be a time when the
country attempted to forget the past, not all citizens accepted this fact. As Andrea Davis writes,
the “'pact of silence' interpretation overestimates the consensual nature of the Transition,”
alluding to the reality that, contrary to the popular narrative, the pact was not universally
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accepted (Davis 2015). When examining this period, we must question why Spain chose to
forget this past instead of confronting it through investigations and prosecutions, as was seen in
Argentina following the Dirty War. In addition to comparing Argentina and Spain’s respective
periods immediately following the end of their dictatorships, looking at the ways in which
activism first becomes present helps us to analyze its role in the future. We thus can understand
why activism was limited and how it later grew during the “time of memory.” Ultimately, this
period marked the invention of official discourse about the war, or rather the lack of discourse,
and the bipartisan celebration of the pact of silence. Despite efforts to stifle attempts to achieve
justice and accountability, this period also boasts the beginning of nascent human rights activists,
that while unable to mobilize, or even call for human rights, managed to begin a process of
informal transitional justice through independent exhumations.

Modes of Transition: Argentina vs. Spain
Comparing the nature of Spain's transition to democracy to that of Argentina’s again
offers us some insight into what may have led to a lack of formal transitional justice measures in
the Spanish state. Spain’s dictatorship ultimately ended with Franco’s death. The country,
pressured by the international community as well as the growing calls for additional freedoms by
the Spanish people, “could not but become a democracy” (Murado 2014). Yet, unlike that of
Argentina, Franco’s regime had a prolonged and natural death without economic, political, or
social collapse, whereas Argentina’s regime could instead be “characterized as a transition by
collapse” (Fields 2006). This collapse, which was discussed in the previous chapter, was due to
economic reasons, the war, and the continued work of the human rights activists. Collapsed
regimes result in a transition in which the outgoing regime cannot impose or negotiate the terms
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of transition, as such, in the case of Argentina, the Junta could not secure their amnesty in the
new democracy (Fields 2004). As opposed to a collapsed transition, Spain experienced a pacted
transition. This mode of transition allowed for negotiation between both opponents and
supporters of Franco, resulting as typically does in pacted transitions, the preservation of some
elements related to the old regime (“Democratization.”). Additionally, Argentina had a strong
party organization immediately following the end of the dictatorship, whereas “strong party
organizations (let alone disciplined organizations) did not exist in Spain prior to the transition
(aside from the arguable exception of the PCE), but rather had to be created” (Fields 2006, 95).
As noted by Fields, “The constraints of transition pact making without institutional guarantees,
in contrast, were not present in Argentina” and thus may suggest “that transitions by collapse
may produce an environment in which party organizational development is "freer"” (Field 2006,
96). Thus it is made apparent that the nature of Spain’s mode of transition in it of itself allowed
for negotiation, which resulted in widespread amnesty and the creation of the pact of silence.

The Creation of an Official Narrative and the Pact of Silence
Interestingly, Escuerdo notes that despite this clear obstruction of justice, “Official
ideologists consider the Spanish transition successful and the hegemonic structures in place since
the transition occurred have transmitted this characterization to the public” (Escuerdo 2014,
125). The assertion that the transition was successful, and to be modeled by other countries, fails
to acknowledge the severe implications of their actions regarding the lack of transitional justice
and accountability for their past, which Escuerdo, too, acknowledges. The narrative that the
transition was successful only further silenced victims. However, the belief that this transition
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was something to be praised reflects the significant effort of both the political left and right to
maintain this narrative.
While the pact of silence may have been informal and silently agreed upon, the lack of
transitional justice mechanisms was obvious. After the ratification of the democratic Constitution
in 1978, the country actively opted out of pursuing a truth commission or investigating the past, a
process that was seen by other countries of the same time (Phelps 2014). No transitional
mechanisms were put in place, and no official apologies were given (Escuerdo 2014). The
government blocked all possible demands for “truth, justice, and reparation for the victims of
decades of human rights violations” (Escuerdo 2014, 131). While they created democracy, they
avoided actions for accountability and justice.
This process of forgetting was only worsened by the passing of the 1977 Amnesty Law
by the newly established democracy. This law gave legal official pardoning to actions committed
by both sides during the Civil War (Phelps 2014). As such, the law simultaneously “included
both those victimized by Franquist repression and the agents of that repression” (Boyd 2008).
This legal codification of forgetting, similar to the pact, was argued as necessary to ensure
stability as the country transitioned to the democracy, which Boyd argues was “a concession to
the right that reflected the balance of political forces at the time” (Boyd 2008). This law,
however, has proven to be the greatest obstacle to justice in which it remains in place to this day.

A Form of Reparations?
Following the end of the dictatorship, there were some, albeit limited, attempts to provide
reparations for victims of the dictatorship. “In the light of these measures, it may be argued that
transitional politics moved away from a model of absolute oblivion to one that aspired to
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rehabilitate victims whose fate until that point had been totally neglected” (Gil 2012, 109). These
compensations were almost entirely economic. Amnesty laws included the rehabilitation of “
assistant personnel in courts and tribunals, teaching staff as well as military personnel who had
been separated from service during the dictatorship” (Gil). This also resulted in the extension of
pensions to Republian army officers and those who were injured during the Civil War and
dictatorship (Gil). While the decentralized government model in which the autonomous
communities had their own local governments had allowed for cases of exhumations, which will
be discussed in what follows, the general response from the government in addressing this past
was incredibly limited and contextualized. There was no ownership for the past abuses, or
recognition of the full-extent of the suffering, but rather attempts made to “neutralize” and
“equalize” by-products of the war through equal financial compensations to those on both sides
of the war.

Activists Fight Back
Despite this push to forget by the new government, activism took the form through
scholarly research and the exhumations of Republicans killed. As previously discussed,
knowledge surrounding the events of what occurred during the Spanish Civil War and
dictatorship were only made public due to the work of scholars and historians. Boyd writes that,
“For the generation of historians who came to professional maturity in the 1960s and early
1970s, scholarly research was a form of political activism whose target was the official Franquist
memory of the war as a crusade against the godlessness, anarchy, and antipatriotism of the
Second Republic” (Boyd ). The transition presented an opportunity for scholars and historians to
gain access to archival information that had previously been sealed (Boyd). The information
collected by researchers, who worked to gather victim testimony and engage in thoughtful and
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thorough research, proved crucial in helping to disseminate information previously hidden to the
general public. Boyd notes that, “Although the Socialist government of Felipe González
abstained in 1986 from official commemoration of what the prime minister termed an “uncivil
war,” scholars were less inhibited, organizing dozens of conferences and collective publications
whose primary purpose was to disseminate the results of scholarly research on the war” (Boyd
136). By the 1990s, scholars felt able to “dispense with the myth of collective responsibility that
had facilitated the transition” (Boyd 2008). Their findings proved monumental in that they broke
down myths that had been constructed by the government. One clear example of this was the
findings of new statistics that, “demonstrated conclusively that the victims of Nationalist
repression vastly outnumbered those killed by the revolutionary left at the outbreak of the war,
deal[ing] another blow to the myth of equal responsibility” (Boyd 2008). While the work of
scholars and historians was incredibly important in shifting a corrective narrative into the
present, this shift did not occur until the 90s and early 2000s. As such, the impact of the work of
scholars and historians immediately following the dictatorship was limited in terms of effecting
widespread change, at least initially.

A Return to Exhumations
Paloma Aguilar’s article “Unwilling to Forget: Local Memory Initiatives in Post-Franco
Spain” illustrates how citizens pushed back against this silence through the exhumation of
Republicans killed during the Civil War. By harnessing the support of local politicians and
priests, relatives of the deceased “decided to overcome fear and to fight against different kinds of
obstacles to deal with the past,” one of these ways being through the exhumation of the bodies of
their loved ones buried in mass graves (Aguilar 2017).
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While Aguilar’s research focuses on four regions in Spain, her work speaks to a larger narrative
in which we begin to see how local actors began to take tangible and significant action. This
action ultimately allowed for the dissemination of these methods to other regions, and laid the
groundwork for future activism.
Aguilar provides information on two cases to highlight the varying processes families
faced during their efforts to exhume the bodies. She first explains the case of Navarra, a province
that had extreme left-support (Aguilar 2017). She notes that in Navarra, priests were motivated to
assist families due to their direct personal links to loved ones executed. Moreover, these priests
were supported by the solidarity of a section of the Church of Navarro, who attempted to
persuade the Spanish Church to apologize for their support of Francoist efforts during the Civil
War (Aguilar 2017). These two characteristics greatly assisted families in their appeals for
action, in which they relied on priests specifically to offer a proper service for their loved ones.
Aguilar writes that:
And to have a large group of parish priests at their side at such a time was not without its
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significance, not just because their moral authority helped overcome administrative
obstacles, but also for their great management and organisational capacity. The
communication networks between them facilitated the coordination of diverse actions
required to find remains, move them and organise subsequent tributes (Aguilar 2017).

In this sense, we see how some priests and local governments acted as activists themselves. The
support and coordination of these groups ultimately allowed for these families, who, too, were
activists, to carry out these exhumations.
The case of Felisa Casatejada, who tried to exhume the bodies of her two brothers that
were executed without trial after the war, describes the danger associated with trying to exhume
these bodies. This case occurred in Casas de Don Pedro, a municipality in Extremadura. As
opposed to the exhumations in Navara, the Casatejada family experienced significant challenges,
both in terms of getting support for their actions by the local government and priests, as well as
considerable threats from the public. Aguilar recounts this, writing:
When planning to move the remains, they suffered threats from right-wing groups which
painted graffiti in the village, distributed flyers against Felisa, put pressure on the parish
priest and mayor to prevent the remains from being transferred and tribute from being
paid, and sent various kinds of intimidating messages. These included threats that the
remains would be burned, leading the family to spend two days and nights keeping watch
over the site, followed by several long nights in the cemetery to prevent the grave from
being destroyed (Aguilar 419).

While this was a trying time in history to attempt these exhumations, with true threats and
obstacles in place, some families continued to pursue the process of exhuming their relatives and
thus engaged in acts of resistance and activism. Despite the lack of formal processes available to
them to achieve accountability and justice, their actions resulted in an engagement that can be
considered part of an informal process of transitional justice. Through these exhumations,
families actualized their desires for justice, at least in part, without the official support of the
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state and their institutions. For some families, they “remained paralysed by fears of stirring up
the past and did not even consider the possibility until many years later” (Aguilar 2017, 410).
Yet, these individual cases of activism speak to a larger push towards transitional justice, which
we see become more apparent years later.

Part IV: Time of Memory
Jose Gonzalez notes that the “Time of Memory” seems to emerge in the 1990s in which
the country began to examine their past (Gonzaléz 2009). This period saw the clear emergence of
human rights activists who attempted to uncover this past and began to demand justice. While
the previous sections have shown how activism first emerged during the “time of silence”
through art, the rise of information produced by scholars and historians, as well as independent
exhumations, during the “time of forgetfulness” we see how the general public became
increasingly involved in the debate of revisiting the past. As stated by Gonzaléz,“Almost 70% of
the Spanish population agree with the investigation of the Civil War and the rehabilitation of the
victims” (Gonzaléz 2009, 179).The following will look at the various ways in which human
rights activists and organizations attempted to push forward a formal process of transitional
justice, as well as informally engage in a process of transitional justice. Additionally, I will
analyze what caused this reexamination of the past and how it allowed for a new space to emerge
in which activism could occur and demands for justice finally be made.
Part of the reasoning for what has been called the “memory boom” during this period, in
which art, film, literature, and discussion all seemed to rapidly emerge, was the maturation of a
new generation of Spaniards eager to learn about this past. Boyd writes that:
At the turn of the twenty-first century, 45 percent of the Spanish population was too
young to recall either the war or the dictatorship. For this generation- the grandchildren
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of those who had endured the war and the children of those who had agreed to "forget"
the past to make possible the transition- recovery of the memories of those previously
silenced was a way of satisfying their curiosity about the past (Boyd 2008, 142).

For many Spaniards, learning about the past was borne out of natural curiosity. The temporal
separation likely offered distance from the pain that the previous generations had faced as a
result of the Civil War and subsequent dictatorship. As Gonzalez states:
The current situation is that people want to know. They want to know where the bodies of
their disappeared are, why they were shot, and in what common graves their mortal
remains a lie. They want to know the names of the 850 buried in Cantabria and the 7250
shot in the cemetery of Valencia. They want to honour the memory of their dead, recover
their forgotten dignity, close their own wounds and carry on with their lives. Opposed to
the strategy of forgetfulness and silence about the past that was at the basis of the
reconciliation between Spaniards at the end of Franco’s regime, today a new strategy is
made possible, rooted in the knowledge of the pain of the Civil War victims and the
repression of Franco’s dictatorship (González 2009).

But, in addition to curiosity that was bred, this new generation was struck with the need to
uncover what had been “forgotten”- a need for knowledge. The literature and scholarly work that
had been previously produced, and became newly produced during this period by scholars and
historians, found new relevance. This time allowed rise to newly founded organizations
determined to uncover this past, such as the ARHM, as well as the production of film that dealt
with this past, a resurgence of activism, and, finally, official action taken by the Spanish state that
begins to address this past. As evidence of this, we see the Spanish Parliament declare the year
2006 as the Year of Historical Memory, followed by the institution of the Historical Memory
Law.
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Expansion of International Human Rights Laws
In addition to an increase in knowledge, and a new generation of Spaniards eager to learn
about and address this past, other factors can be determined to have influenced this return to
memory that developed in Spain. Specifically, the evolution of human rights laws, and the
influence of their applications in the international community, resulted in a new opportunity to
revisit this past and demand justice. As Lavedra wrote, “The 1990s were marked by an
extraordinary impulse of international human rights law. In this period, the principles for which
the international community had fought since Nuremberg were afﬁrmed” (Lavedra 2012, 70).
Argentina was remarkable in that they carried out a series of investigations and prosecutions
immediately following the end of their dictatorship despite the “absence of relevant rules of
international human rights law” (Lavedra 2012, 57). However, by the 1990s, these rules had been
established (Lavedra 2012). While these new norms were extensive, they included the success of
the creation of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda by the UN Security Council in 1993 and 1994 (Lavendra 2012). As Lavendra notes,
“Through the establishment of these tribunals, the international community indicated its
commitment to prosecute and punish in an effective manner the war crimes and crimes against
humanity that had been committed in these countries” (Lavendra 2012, 71). Additionally, the
creation of the International Criminal Court in 2002 and various declarations by the United
Nations (such as the UN Declaration concerning the Protection of All Persons against Enforced
Disappearances in 1992), helped to strengthen and normalize the international human rights laws
(Lavendra 2012). Finally, the extradition and trial of Augusto Pinochet by Spanish Judge Garzón
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served as a major catalyst in the Spanish movement to uncover their own past. Encarnacíon
argues that:
The end of civil society’s complicity with the Pact of Forgetting is best understood as a
by-product of the collapse of the elite consensus on the past that materialized with the
democratic transition. It was only then that civil society demands for some kind of
recognition of the past began to get some traction in the public sphere. The obvious
catalyst that shattered the elite consensus on the past was Spain’s indictment in 1998 of
Chilean general Augusto Pinochet for his role in the bloody military coup that crushed
the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende in 1973. (Encarnación 2014,
132).
While Encarnación asserts that the Spanish involvement in the case of Pinochet, in which Chile
engaged in a process of re-examining and criminally prosecuting Pinochet for his crimes via the
laws of universal jurisdiction, I would argue that this was likely the metaphorical “straw that
broke the camel's back” (Encarnación 2014). The case of Pinochet created ripple effects across
the world, and in the case of Spain, this became especially relevant to the country's process of
re-examining its past. Firstly, it explored legal innovations that Judge Garzón introduced,
reopening the question of possible criminal prosecutions in Spain. Secondly, it reminded the
Spanish people of their past, and created the desire for reconciliation of past atrocities and
justice. Finally, the conditions were ripe to truly carry out the process of transitional justice, all
because of the effect of Pinochet’s trial, the precedents set by it, and the advancements in
international law.

The Influence of Film on Memory
Nuria Teson, a reporter for the Spanish newspaper El Pais, stated that, “Spain is waking
up after a long lethargy. In part, thanks to the massive amount of publications on the civil war on
TV, films, and literature that tell "the other side of the story” (Espinoza 2007). While activism
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was certainly present during the period of forgetfulness, as previously described, the general
public was less involved in this conversation up until the 1990s and early 2000s. As Boyd writes,
“ordinary Spaniards’ apparently insatiable curiosity about the war was satisfied by a deluge of
popular publications, television programs, and films” (Boyd 2008, 136). Directly following the
end of the dictatorship, Spain entered a cultural and artistic boom. It wasn’t until around the 90s,
though, that the country saw the emergence of various artistic forms of expression that directly
confronted and uncovered the past. While the forms in which media and art varied, film has been
one major influence on the country’s understanding of the past.
Film has forced the country to visually confront this past and became a useful tool in
which activists could shed light on the abuses of the past. The film “Franco’s Forgotten
Children” was one of the first attempts to uncover the systematic kidnapping of minors during
the dictatorship (Corbalán 2019). An abuse that was not well known by the public until 2002, the
film’s directors, Ricard Bellis and Montse Armengou, embarked on an investigation into this
dark part of the country’s past (Corbalán 2019). Through the utilization of archival footage and
interviews, “the film pursued an ethical commitment to expose the illegal repatriation of minors,
the forced separation of political prisoners and their children, and the restitution of their
identities” under Franco (Corbalán 2019, 221). As Ruth Amir writes, “The testimonies are
devastating and empowering at the same time” (Amir 2016, 125). Women recount the horrors
that they experienced while in prisons and concentration camps, including “torture, violence,
disease, and hunger” (Amir 2016, 124). Their reasonings for ending up in these inhumane
conditions also highlight the injustice of the period, Amir writing that, “These are women who
attempted to flee Spain by sea from Alicante and Valencia and were forcibly disembarked;
women who were guilty by association as spouses, mothers or sisters, and children of Republican
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parents or people targeted by the Francoists” (Amir 2016, 125). The new ability to understand
what these abuses included, as well as the reasons for the imprisonment and detention of these
women, helped to bring about public consciousness. Thus, these films can be understood as
powerful tools of activism, Corbalán noting that, “The novels and films whose main theme is the
forced separation of children from their parents during both dictatorships can be interpreted as
mechanisms of resistance against the remnants of a turbulent past” (Corbalán 2019, 220).
Recent years have continued to push forward a new narrative that exposes other failures,
including the country’s flawed transition to democracy and the multitude of abuses committed
during the Civil War and dictatorship. Such works include the 2018 documentary The Silence of
Others by Almudena Carracedo and Robert Bahar. This film primarily focuses on the lawsuit
filed in 2010 by a group of victims in Argentina in hopes of achieving justice through legal
accountability. With a direct focus on the victim experience, this film highlights how the 1977
Amnesty Law “has proved a formidable obstacle to justice” (Kenigsberg 2019). Personal
accounts are startling and heartbreaking. Of those featured is José María Galante who “lives “just
meters” from the man he says tortured him,” spotlighting just how absent accountability remains
today (Kenigsberg 2019).
The effects of these films are important to consider. Their creation operated outside of
formal institutional mechanisms, but actively allowed the public to participate in the acquisition
of this knowledge and the subsequent arisal of a differing narrative. As Kenigsberg writes, “Of
course, the mere existence of legal proceedings abroad puts pressure on Spain to attend to its
past” (Kenigsberg 2019). Their production visually forces the public to confront and understand
this past and their factual evidence based on real events ultimately cannot be denied (Corbalán
2019, 220).
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Newspaper Obituaries
Human Rights activists took other creative measures to call attention to their cause as
well as to provide a certain type of justice for the victims when mechanisms of formal
accountability and justice were blocked. Dubbed “la de las esquelas” (obituary wars) by the
Spanish media, relatives of those killed during the Spanish Civil War pushed the debate over the
past into the public spotlight by submitting obituaries of their lost loved ones to the newspaper
(Encarnación 2014). As Encarnación wrote, through these actions relatives “appeared to be
fighting the war all over again” (Encarnación 2014, 154). The first obituary appeared in July of
2006 in which the family of Franco’s first victim, Commander Virgilio Leret Ruiz, published an
obituary for him in the Spanish newspaper El País (Espinoza 2007). In this obituary, Carlota
Leret, the commander’s daughter, writes: “Commander Virgilio Leret Ruiz was a victim of
Francoist terrorism. He was shot at dawn on 18 July 1936 after surrendering. As a result of a pact
of silence that is unacceptable in any democratic society, Spain still has a debt of justice, truth
and the memory to the victims” (Espinoza 2007). The publication of this obituary, in which the
family spent approximately $12,000 on the half-page print, created a spark in the public that
resulted in the publication of similar addresses from victims on both sides of the Civil War
(Encarnación 2014).
Since the obituaries posted during this time were for both Republicans and Nationalists
killed, the language used in these obituaries varied. Each side fought to publish and express their
own narratives. Encarnación noted that, “Left-wing sympathizers usually include a political
explanation such as “killed defending the legitimate government of the Republic and the
Constitution,” while right-wing sympathizers generally offer a religious explanation such as
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“vilely murdered because of his faith and devotion to God.” (Encarnación 2014, 155). The
difference in language reflected an ongoing battle between both sides, the families of
Republicans killing trying to push forward this new description of the past while Nationalist
families attempted to maintain the old narrative. Espinoza noted this divide writing, “Francisco
Ferrandiz, an anthropologist studying the language of the obituaries, said that they 'reflect the
latent clash between the memory of the defeated and the memory of the winners'.” (Espinoza
2007). WRAP

Association for the Recuperation of the Historical Memory (ARMH)
In 2000, journalist Emilio Silva formed the Association for the Recuperation of the
Historical Memory (ARMH). Silva was part of this new generation of grandchildren who was
determined to dig deeper into Spain’s own “forgotten” past, his own grandfather having been
shot by Franco’s army in 1936 (Encarnación 2014). The work of the ARMH has been incredibly
pertinent to the rise of public discussion surrounding the country’s past and has made them,
arguably, the most influential activist organization in the country. The organization has been
credited for helping to provide various forms of reparations for victims of Franco’s abuse, annul
judicial proceedings that occurred during the War and under the dictatorship, exhume mass
graves from the Civil War, remove relics, markings, and monuments associated with the old
regime from public spaces, and create the nation archive of the Civil War so that these
documents are now accessible to the public (Encarnación 2014).
The ARMH can be credited for advancing numerous efforts related to the protection and
preservation of human rights associated with abuses related to the Civil War and dictatorship.
While the aforementioned has all been significant, the ARMH’s work in leveraging the
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international community has been particularly useful in their fight for justice. In hopes of gaining
international support and awareness towards their cause, human rights activists, including that of
the ARMH, began searching outside of their borders. The ARMH played an active role in this
endeavor, appearing before the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in
Geneva in 2002 (Encarnación 2014). They presented their organization’s findings and ultimately
advocated for the Spanish governments to pay for the exhumation of bodies and proper burials,
as well as the creation of a commission “to investigate the facts surrounding the fate of those
who disappeared during the Civil War” (Encarnación 2014). The ARMH’s advocacy resulted in
the UN’s inclusion of Spain in the UN list of countries that had unresolved problems related to a
history of state crimes and repression (Encarnación 2014). The UN later took additional
measures to hold Spain accountable for their past by calling on them “to investigate the fate of
Republicans killed following the Civil War and undertake the exhumation of known graves of
the disappeared” (Encarnación 2014). By drawing on the international community, human rights
activists and organizations like the ARMH were able to bring global attention to this issue and
help put pressure on the Spanish government in their demands for action.

Exhumations and Burials
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, it was the exhumation of thirteen victims’ bodies
killed during the Civil War that seemed to spark a national conversation regarding Spain’s past.
After activists sought out and gained support from the international community in their efforts to
pressure Spain to exhume the bodies, they chose to act instead of passively waiting for a
response (Encarnación 2014). The ARMH, again, played an important role in these efforts.
Through private financing and volunteering, the group executed these first thirteen exhumations
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in October 2000 that gained national and international attention (Encarnación 2014). A mere six
years later, the ARMH alone exhumed “some forty gravesites containing the remains of 520
bodies” (Encarnación 2014). While this is a significant and noteworthy milestone, it is thought
that there are still approximately 30,000 bodies lying in mass graves scattered across the country
yet to be exhumed (Adler 2004).
The exhumations and reburials have released a flood of storytelling about events such as
the killing of the Poyales del Hoyo women. The bodies have a kind of eloquence that
gives permission, even encourages, that the long silence be broken and that the repressed
memories be spoken aloud and re-engaged. Clandestine killings cease to be secret with
the "testimony" and materiality of corpses, often with marks identifying the means of
death. Oddly perhaps, human remains are more enduring, and more persuasive, than a
living person's memory and testimony. The story told by the bodies in light of competing
truth claims offers irrefutable evidence of what occurred in the villages; it renders any
denials impossible.
Historical Memory Law:
In 2006, the government introduced a “Bill in order to recognize and extend the rights,
and to establish measures in favour, of those that suffered persecution or violence during the
Civil War and the dictatorship,” resulting in the creation of the ‘Historical Memory Law
(González 2009, 181). In González’s words, “This law intends to remember the spirit of
reconciliation and concord that made possible the political Transition from dictatorship to
democracy and that allowed the Constitution of 1978 to be written, the best model of coexistence
in the whole of Spanish history” (González 2009, 181). As stated by González, the bill details a
variety of measures including:
(1) Improving the economic rights of the families of the victims and granting the families of
those that were killed in defence of democracy the right to economic indemnification.
(2) Making possible the location and identification of the disappeared as a final demonstration of
respect towards them.
(3) Eliminating the symbols and monuments of the Civil War and the dictatorship because public
symbols must be related to encounters, not confrontations.
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(4) Special recognition towards the volunteers of the International Brigades and the citizen
Associations that distinguished themselves in defending the dignity of the victims.
(5) Bettering an understanding of the past because the duty of memory is based on the
knowledge of the tragic facts of the past. Therefore, ‘knowing in order to remember’ seems to be
the best motto. For this goal, the following actions are undertaken:
● A Documentary Centre of Historical Memory is created.
● The role of the present General Archive of the Spanish Civil War with a seat in
Salamanca is reinforced.
● The recollection of oral testimonies of the victims of the violence in the Civil War and the
repression following upon it is facilitated.
● The State will acquire and protect documents on the Civil War and the dictatorship.
(González 2009, 182).

These measures are reminiscent of the goals and actions taken by the ARMH, as well as those
taken by individual activists beginning during the “time of forgetfulness.” As such, we begin to
see how activists’ work can be realized through formal processes by the state with the building of
public consciousness, the creation of a social movement, and the proliferation of work related to
this subject.

Exhumation of Franco’s Body
But, exhumations of victims killed by Franco are not the only exhumations that have
been widely debated. In recent years, the exhumation of Franco himself is of particular
significance and has drawn considerable controversy. On October 24, 2019, after months of legal
battles, Franco’s body was exhumed from El Valle de los Caídos (the Valley of the Fallen), where
the former dictator had been laid to rest for over 40 years (Booker 2019). The exhumation of
Franco represents a growing national narrative surrounding the need for government action in
regards to accountability for the past. And, this action represents a step in the direction towards
acknowledgement for this past coupled with tangible action.
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Additionally, the removal of Franco’s body from Valle de los Caídos has given activists
hope that it will result in further exhumations. The burial site is not only home to Franco, but to
an additional estimated 33,000 other people, one third of whom remain unidentified (Minder
2019). While some of those buried fought for Franco, opponents of Franco are also buried there
(Minder 2019). Specifically, it is known that Republican prisoners of war who constructed the
monument, which took 18 years to complete, are among the buried (Minder 2019). As noted by
Minder, “Exhuming Franco is very important, but it should also help our society care far more
about the many who were dumped in the mausoleum built to the glory of Spain’s dictator,
without the consent or even the knowledge of their families” (Minder 2019).

Conclusion
The case of Spain presents us with a process of transitional justice that contrasts significantly
Argentina’s. This being said, Spain’s case helps us to understand the significance of informal
processes of transitional justice when transitional justice is completely blocked. With more
recent actions being taken by the state, it seems that Spain may be following Argentina’s
footsteps and, hopefully, opening the doors for a formal process of transitional justice that
includes prosecutions, among other actions that have been demanded by human rights activists
and organizations.
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Chapter 4

"We have created a narrative of denial. We think if we own up to our mistakes, something
bad is going to happen to us. We're going to get punished. And I'm not doing these projects
because I want to punish America. I want us to be liberated from the chains that this history has
created" (Raphelson 2018). Bryan Stevensen, founder of the Equal Justice Initiative, made this
statement regarding his hopes for the creation of The National Memorial for Peace and Justice.
Opened in Montgomery, Alabama on April 26, 2018, Stevensen “wanted the memorial to
capture just how brutal the targeted killing of black people was in Jim Crow South” (Raphelson
2018). Influenced by the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin and the Apartheid Museum in
Johannesburg, the memorial tackles the historical oppression of black people in America. The
mueseum speaks to a growing narrative in which the United States has begun to understand how
the history of slavery has led to a cycle of oppression that continues to impact the country.
The creation of this museum is just one example of the new wave of projects and
initiatives in the United States that address historical oppression of African-Americans in the
country, both historically and today. As this conversation begins to draw increasingly more
attention and traction, we see the country begin to question beginning a process of transitional
justice. As the United States considers this, I then ask, is there anything we can learn from the
experiences of Argentina and Spain? In this thesis I have argued that we must conceptualize
transitional justice more broadly so as to include both non-judicial and judicial mechanisms. In
addition to this, I now culminate my argument by asserting that we must come to understand
transitional justice to also include both formal and informal processes so that even when met
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with impunity, activists can achieve accountability, justice, and remembrance, among other
goals. Argentina, which underwent a formal process of transitional justice, followed by a period
of impunity, and then a return to transitional justice, demonstrated how both formal and informal
processes of transitional justice are crucial to achieving justice, ensuring remembrance, and
holding individuals accountable. Spain, whose process can perhaps be more easily compared to
the U.S., has only just begun what seems to be a process of formal transitional justice, as seen
through the passing of the historical memory law. Both countries have highlighted that informal
mechanisms are equally important to that of formal mechanisms of transitional justice.
Specifically, the two cases have highlighted how crucial human rights activists are to both
pushing forward a formal process of transitional justice and engaging in an informal process of
transitional justice which in itself is significant. I thus turn my attention to what we can learn
from the experiences in Spain and Argentina and how they can be applied to the U.S..

Part I. The Need for a Social Movement
Both Argentina and Spain illustrated the importance of memory in ensuring the success
of human rights movements and bringing about public consciousness. While the production of
the CONADEP Nunca Más report proved effective in bringing the public's attention to the full
extent of the abuses that occurred at the hands of the state, the work of human rights activists
also highlighted the influence of their efforts on the creation of a movement. As Simon and
Gready wrote:
Social movements have driven democratisation in various parts of the world and can
reasonably be credited as integral to the creation of the contemporary discourse of
transitional justice, most notably through victims’ movements such as the Madres de
Plaza de Mayo in Argentina and the Khulumani Support Group in South Africa. Yet they
remain on the margins of transitional justice scholarship and discourse. Social
movements are ‘collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in
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sustained interactions with elites, opponents and authorities’ through which it is argued
the marginalised or otherwise disenfranchised can challenge the dynamics of power in
society (Gready and Simon 2017, 958).

While the United State’s democracy has remained much more stable than was seen in Argentina,
who experienced periods of civil rule punctuated by military dictatorships, the need to challenge
authority so as to confront ongoing oppression remains of considerable importance. As Simon
and Gready suggest, the work of social movements prove essential in helping to create solidarity
amongst all communities so as to push against unjust dominant narratives and achieve justice for
those marginalized, forgotten, and oppressed. As such, we begin to see the emergent need for a
social movement in the U.S. that aims to achieve this- a turn towards transitional justice. Should
the U.S. form a movement that unifies the collective need for change and pushes against a cycle
of violence and oppression that black people in America face, they too may find success in
achieving transitional justice.
Furthermore, both Argentina and Spain demonstrated the need to bring attention to these
issues in order to form a social movement. Again, looking to Argentina and the work of The
Madres de Plaza de Mayo, we see the influence of their work on mobilizing the public to act in
resistance against the state. Simon and Gready made note of this significance writing:
The Madres de Plaza de Mayo famously used a public space in Buenos Aires to
remember their children disappeared by the Argentinian junta. The mothers’ weekly
marches sought to advance formal justice and challenge cultures of silence,
emphasising the importance of performativity to social movement collective action, using
vocabularies of emotion rather than those of law. It was a mobilisation that drove a
nascent transitional justice practice, including ultimately leading to one of the earliest
truth commissions, centred on determining the truth about the disappeared” (Gready and
Simon 2017, 963).
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The work of the Madres proved that transitional justice can be achieved outside of formal
mechanisms. By occupying public space and engaging in a process of remembrance, they were
able to draw attention to the widespread disappearances of children under the dictatorship.
Equally important, their work inspired a movement that pushed forward formal processes of
transitional justice. While this was seen in the prosecutions of the major contributors to the
dictatorship as well as the creation of truth commissions, the Madres work became influential
again when later faced with a period of impunity for the past human rights abuses by the
government. It was during this period in which transitional justice was blocked that the Madres
continued to push against this impunity, as seen through their continued marches, public
presence, and demands for justice. Simultaneously, this period resulted in the emergence of other
human rights activists who innovated their practices and held perpetrators accountable through
non-legal means, as seen through the escrache movement and the work of H.I.J.O.S. and Grupo
de Arte Callejero (GAC). The U.S. has arguably existed in this realm of impunity in which no
transitional justice process has begun or been allowed to grow in a formal manner. As such,
through the use of a social movement, it is possible the U.S. could find similar success in
mobilizing the public and demand action, as has been seen in the other two cases.

Part II. Building Consciousness through Initiatives
While many Americans have been taught to understand America’s birth as having begun
when 102 English people traveled and settled in the “New World” in 1620, slaves had already
occupied America (Shah and Adolphe 2019). A year earlier, the first 20 enslaved Africans had
been forcibly brought to the new British colony. But, for centuries, American history has only
focused on the former narrative. As Michael Guasco stated, “Historians, elected political figures
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[and] community leaders would prefer to sort of imagine the United States as a kind of mythic,
Anglo-Saxon Christian place” (Shah and Adolphe 2019). Additionally, the passing of the 13th
Amendment following the end of the Civil War, has been championed as ending slavery and
allowing for the creation of an “equal” America, but has not actualized the creation of a society
in which equality exists for blacks and their white counterparts. Passed on January 31, 1865, the
13th Amendment states that, “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction” (“The 13th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution” ). Of
course, the institution of “Jim Crow laws; poll taxes; voting rights; segregation; and work camps
like the Parchman Farm in Mississippi” ensured that black people in America remained
oppressed second-class citizens. Similar to what we saw in Spain, the period of silence in the
United States has lasted for centuries. America has struggled to both understand our slave past as
well as the ongoing effects of what resulted in not dealing with this past. As Boris Bittiker
writes,
“To concentrate on slavery is to understate the case for compensation, so much so that
one might almost suspect that the distant past is serving to suppress the ugly facts of the recent
past and of contemporary life. In actuality, slavery was followed not by a century of equality but
by a mere decade of faltering progress, repeatedly checked by violence” (Bittker 1973, 50).

With this lack of understanding, we have seen the urgent need for a reexamination of this past so
as to raise consciousness surrounding this past and its effects on our present and future.
Looking to Spain, we see how the work of scholars and historians helped to ensure a
wealth of information regarding the events of the past were documented despite the government's
lack of investigations. This information paired with the support of organizations like the ARHM
helped to disseminate information to the public and create a narrative that challenged the official
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one that was espoused for decades. As such, we see how important the combination of
knowledge and social movements becomes for human rights activists in attempting to force the
public, and government, to reexamine the past and undergo a process of transitional justice.
The U.S. seems to have begun to try and rewrite this history. The 1619 Project, a
long-form journalism project published by the New York Times is one clear example of this
attempt to push forward a shift in narrative, education, and knowledge surrounding America’s
past. As stated by the editor of the New York Times Magazine, Jake Silverstein, “The goal of The
1619 Project is to reframe American history by considering what it would mean to regard 1619
as our nation’s birth year. Doing so requires us to place the consequences of slavery and the
contributions of black Americans at the very center of the story we tell ourselves about who we
are as a country” (Riley 2020, 1). Through the creation of a series of podcasts, books, and
articles, the 1619 Project aims to expose current and future generations to a new narrative
regarding the history of slavery and its impacts on society today. However, a simple search of
scholarly works on this project reveals a clear lack of embracement regarding the project. The
article “The 1619 Project: Believe Your Lying Eyes” written by Seth Forman includes the
following passage that take direct issue with the project stating:
The 1619 Project tells us to pay no attention to the historical legacy that gave birth to the
nation’s remarkable transformation. Instead, it depicts an America in which racism is so
deeply rooted in every event and time period that these changes are simply not to be
believed. It was not just that blacks were no more free after the Revolutionary War than
before it. The Revolutionary War was fought specifically to keep blacks in chains, to
rescue slavery from a certain British onslaught. The Founders didn’t just fail to apply the
Constitution’s revolutionary principles to blacks, they enshrined slavery—without even
saying the word—in that document for the next century...We eat too much sugar in our
diets today because slavery made “white gold” plentiful. We have more people in jail
than other developed countries because “[s] lavery gave America a fear of black people
and a taste for violent punishment.” And on it goes (Forman 2020, 7).
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Forman’s article is only one of many that attacks the work of the project, citing historical
inaccuracy and false claims that slavery has impacted oppression that may or may not exist for
black people in America. As such, we begin to see that while these initiatives have begun, they
have yet to be accepted by the entire public. In order for the public to truly reexamine history, we
would likely need an explosion of similar projects and initiatives combined with the
aforementioned social movement, as was seen in Spain and Argentina.

Part III. The Use of Art and Film
Both Spain and Argentina utilized art and film as a way to bring attention to issues of
abuse as well as call for the need for accountability and justice. Looking to Spain, we saw the
films Franco’s Forgotten Children aired in 2002 contribute to the rise in awareness regarding the
systematic trafficking of children during the Franco dictatorship. An abuse that went largely
unknown until the early 2000s, the film both called out the need to address this issue as well as
reexamine the past as a whole. A more recent Spanish film that confronts the country’s dark past
is the 2018 documentary The Silence of Others which helped to provide insight into the modern
struggle for justice in the country. Through highlighting personal stories, this film looks at the
active role human rights activists have taken in pursuing independent exhumations, which are in
themselves significant, as well as seek out legal justice through international actors, specifically
that of Argentine judges.
The success and influence of these works has led to the question of whether a similar
form of activism through art and film can be taken by the U.S.. The film 13th has been one
example of an attempt to highlight injustices in the U.S. that have continued despite the passing
of the 13th Amendment. As explained by Vanessa Lopez-Litttleton and Arto Woodley,

Sinatra 101
From an egalitarian perspective, if all people are equal with equal rights and
opportunities, then the plight of the African American over the course of several centuries
is in contrast to this fundamental belief. In this regard, 13th supports the need for a public
health agenda focused on the criminalization, marginalization, and systematic oppression
of African Americans in the United States. Resultantly, there is an increasing need to
collect data on police violence against African Americans as well as the development of
an effective public health agenda that eliminates disparate health and social outcomes.
These proposals are supported by the tragic deaths of Trayvon Martin; Eric Garner;,
Tamir Rice; Jason Harrison; Laquan MacDonald; Oscar Grant; Philando Castile; Freddie
Gray; Sam Boise; and many others who have fallen prey to a system that fails to honor
their bodies (Lopez-Littleton and Woodley 2018, 417).

Part IV: A Push for Formal Action
Argentina has demonstrated the most robust approach towards transitional justice which
has combined both formal and informal processes of transitional justice to confront this past. As
Spain seems to be heading towards a similar path, in which a process of informal transitional
justice has begun to occur and a formal one is being called for, we thus look to what a formal
action, if any, has been taken in the U.S.
While reparations have largely been called for in the U.S., and should certainly be
considered when looking at what formal mechanisms may need to take place, these cases have
resulted in very little success and actualization. Instead, we have seen the beginnings of pushes
towards more symbolic actions. Of these includes the introduction of a joint resolution by
members of the Virginia General Assembly in 2007 “atoning for Virginia’s part in the
enslavement of African and calling for racial reconciliation” (Balfour 2011, 12). This
introduction of this bill into the former capital of the Confederacy is certainly symbolically
significant, yet initial language that directly addressed the linkage of this past to current
oppression was ultimately cut from the final resolution (Balfour 2011). As such, we see how
governments, in this case state governments, have begun to consider this past in relation to the
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present. Yet, these actions remain primarily symbolic, and not as robust as even possible for that
of symbolic actions. The removal of Confederate statues is another example that could be
pointed to, whose removal has been successful in some locations and fervently protected in
others. As such, we ultimately see the potential for institutional action, but the lack of real and
meaningful action in the present.

Conclusion
A 2019 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center found that 63% of Americans
believe that the legacy of slavery still affects the position of black people in American society
today either a great deal or a fair amount (Horowitiz et.al. 2021). The survey also found that,
“more than four-in-ten U.S. adults (45%) think the country hasn’t gone far enough in giving
black people equal rights with whites” (Horowitz et.al. 2021). While the survey indicates
disparities between racial groups, the results still represent a strongly held belief that there is
something deeply wrong in the U.S. today in regard to racial injustices in America today and
their linkages to the country’s slave past. As the U.S. seems to call for a process of transitional
justice, our examination of Argentina and Spain helps us to understand what this may look like.
Ultimately, I have argued that the work of human rights activists, who can form social
movements, challenge official dominant narratives, achieve accountability and justice outside of
institutions, and engage in a practice of remembrance prove essential in the process of
transitional. Both as a formal and informal process, transitional justice mechanisms should be
understood in broad terms that embrace emergent and alternative (ie. not sole
judicial-mechanisms) that may have been preferred when the practice first emerged, and by some
theorists today such as Teitel. Yet, it is through the combination of these practices, the
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combination of non-judicial and judicial mechanisms, of formal and informal processes of
transitional justice, that perhaps would create the best model for contemporary transitional
justice practices and conceptualizations.
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